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Introduction
The antitrust laws seldom provide precise definitions of the
conduct they prohibit, such as driving at more than 70 miles per hour
or paying taxes later than an April 15 deadline. Instead, litigants,
agencies and courts struggle with language that is far less precise, such
as conduct that “restrains trade,” “monopolizes,” or “substantially
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lessens competition.”1 EU Law is only slightly more helpful. While
Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits several specific types of agreements,
most of them are stated in a way that leave considerable room for
interpretation.2 The “abuse … of a dominant position” language of
Article 102 is equally ambiguous.3
Considering mainly U.S. antitrust law, over the years the
courts, enforcement agencies and other writers have attempted to
provide direction through brief expressions of purpose. One that is
enthusiastically promoted by antitrust’s left is the idea that antitrust
should be opposed to “bigness.” A second, advocated by people of

1

15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 13, 14, 18.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU],
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A12008E101%3
AEN%3AHTML.
3
Id. art. 102, prohibiting:
2

Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as
it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
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diverse ideologies, is that antitrust’s purpose is “protection of the
competitive process.”
A third set of approaches ties antitrust policy to some
conception of welfare. These have the advantage that they are more
aligned with the general economics of welfare, which emphasize
competitive markets, productivity and growth, broad opportunities for
consumer choice and labor, and the ability of legal policy to deliver
prosperity to those who are affected by it. They have the disadvantage
of a long history of dispute about meaning and measurement.
The term “consumer welfare” is widely used and criticized as
a way of applying these concerns to competition policy. That term has
two definitions, however, which can embrace very different
approaches to antitrust policy.4 Failure to appreciate the differences
between these two approaches very likely accounts for much of the
objection that has been raised to consumer welfare approaches.
Further, an often-missing detail in discussions of consumer
welfare as an antitrust goal is that “welfare” is almost never what
antitrust policy and litigation actually measure. Rather they focus on
two types of evidence that are more accessible – namely, output and
price. While antitrust policy often speaks about consumer “welfare”
as the appropriate antitrust goal, the thing that it actually measures is
either changes in output or changes in price.
None of these expressions of purpose is explicit in the antitrust
statutes themselves. They are useful mainly to the extent that they
provide additional guidance for interpretation of the statutory
language. To have value a statement of purpose must add some
meaning to the language that is already in the statutes, without
contradicting it. For example, does “consumer welfare” add any
substance to Sherman Act §1’s condemnation of contracts that
“restrain trade”? Or does the phrase “protection of the competitive

4

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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process” add much to determining whether particular conduct
“monopolizes” or “lessens competition”?
These various expressions can also be described as either
slogans or goals. Slogans are intended to produce broad assent, even
among people who might disagree strongly about specific rules or
outcomes. As a statement of antitrust principles, a slogan is generally
pleasing to hear and difficult to dispute. In the abstract, who can
disagree with the idea that antitrust should protect the “competitive
process”? “Protection of the competitive process” is a slogan, not a
goal.
While slogans usually produce widespread assent, they have
the disadvantage that they do not define the types of conduct that they
do and do not condemn. Indeed, that is why they can claim such broad
agreement. In contrast to slogans, the term “goal” implies an
identifiable target, such as a soccer goalpost or a basketball hoop.
Goals are less likely to claim broad assent. Once a particular goal is
accepted, however, it produces more consensus around a particular
outcome. This is not to say that goals are easy to measure, and often
they are not. Rather, a goal creates a common set of criteria for
measurement. It does not remove every dispute about whether a
particular player actually scored.
Most of these statements of antitrust’s purpose are
fundamentally economic. Here, welfare approaches are the most
useful because of their economic definitions of competition,
monopoly, and growth, as well as their use of economic tools to
interpret evidence. The idea that antitrust should pursue bigness as
such is an exception, although even that depends on the criteria that
we use to identify “big” actors.
The antitrust statutes themselves and their early interpretation
can be helpful. At common law the term “restraint of trade” in Section
1 of the Sherman Act was applied to restrictions on the volume of
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output or trade.5 This formulation preceded any coherent conception
of the idea of “welfare” in modern economics, which is largely a
creature of the 1920s and 1930s.6 Early scholarship and case law on
the antitrust laws and trusts adopted this output-focused definition,
using such phrases as “restrict output” or “restrict production.”7 The
Republican Platform under which Theodore Roosevelt was elected
President in 1900 spoke of conspiracies to “limit production” and
“control prices.”8 To “monopolize,” as §2 of the Sherman Act forbids,
5

15 U.S.C. § 1.
See, e.g., ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932);
see also J. R. Hicks, The Scope and Status of Welfare Economics, 27 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 307 (1975) (arguing that Pigou was originator of modern
welfare economics, although conceding that a case can be made for Pareto,
who wrote earlier).
7
See Herbert Pope, The Legal Aspect of Monopoly, 20 HARV. L. REV. 167,
177 (1907) (“raise price or limit output”); Book Review, 28 HARV. L. REV.
642, 643 (1915) (reviewing WILLIAM TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1914)) (“restriction of output”); WILLIAM TAFT, THE
ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 60 (1914) (“restrict
production”); Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust
Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 778 (1955) (“restricting output”); William
Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Judicial Interpretation, 68
YALE L.J. 900, 903 (1959) (“limit output”); W. M. Rapsher, Dangerous
“Trusts,” 146 N. AM. REV. 509, 510 (1888) (defining trusts as ability to
“sustain the prices” and “to arbitrarily limit production”); D.M. Mickey,
Note, Trusts, 22 AM. L. REV. 538, 538 (1888) (“limiting production”); see
also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909)
(challenging contracts that “limited the production, output, and markets”),
aff’d, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Wheeler-Stenzel v. Nat’l Window Glass Jobbers
Assn., 152 F. 864, 870 (3d Cir. 1907) (“restrict the output”); cf. United States
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700, 726-727 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (dismissing the
complaint because none of the challenged agreements appeared to limit
output), rev’d, 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Chicago Wall Paper Mills v. General
Paper Co., 147 F. 491 (7th Cir. 1906) (applying Illinois’ state antitrust law,
which made it unlawful to “prevent, restrict or diminish the manufacture or
output of any such article” (quoting 1891 Ill. Laws 206)).
8
The 1900 Republican party platform stated:
[W]e condemn all conspiracies and combinations intended
to restrict business, to create monopolies, to limit
production, or to control prices, and favor such legislation
as will effectively restrain and prevent all such abuses,
6
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was a clear reference to an economic conception associated with
higher prices and, accordingly, reduced output.9 Article 102 of The
European Union’s TFEU also refers to abuse of a dominant position
as “limiting production….”10
Notwithstanding the overwhelming Progressive influence that
guided passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, the substantive provisions
all use similar and unambiguously economic terms. They condemn
price differences, tying, exclusive dealing and mergers, but only when
their effects may be “substantially to lessen competition,” or “tend to
create a monopoly.”11
Alternatives that view the purpose of antitrust in terms of noneconomic goals such as justice or fairness have been around since the
antitrust statutes were passed, but they are not reflected in the statutes
and have never claimed broad consensus.12 They invariably fall apart
when forced to make specific rules. These alternatives usually boil
down to some form of small business protectionism, often based on
nostalgia for a time gone by when the economy was governed by
smaller firms with less organized distribution systems or more

protect and promote competition, and secure the rights of
producers, laborers, and all who are engaged in industry and
commerce.
THOMAS HUDSON MCKEE, NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS 34243 (4th ed. 1901).
9
15 U.S.C. § 2. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Monopolizing and the
Sherman Act, 64 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
10
See note __, supra.
11
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 (predatory price discrimination), 14 (tying and
exclusive dealing), 18 (mergers).
12
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Invention of Antitrust, 95 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022). For one of the most forceful defenses of the position
that antitrust should incorporate non-economic goals, see Robert Pitofsky,
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979). For a
recent attempt, see Sanjukta Paul, Recovering the Moral Economy
Foundations of the Sherman Act, 131 YALE L.J. 175 (2021).
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primitive technology. They also reflect the significant power of trade
associations and other organizations that support these groups.13
This paper evaluates the most commonly used expressions
about the purpose of antitrust law. The first, control of “bigness,” has
never been a declared goal in antitrust legislation or judicial decision
making, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected it as an
antitrust goal.14 That may change, however, depending on the passage
of legislation concerning large digital platforms that Congress is
contemplating. At this point whether it is best treated as a slogan or a
goal is hard to say. The second, “protection of the competitive
process,” is almost always used as a slogan. While it has rhetorical
appeal, no one has yet figured out how it should be applied as a
decisional tool. Finally, the idea that antitrust should be concerned
with some conception of welfare very likely remains dominant as an
articulation of antitrust’s goals, even though ideological abuse and
definitional problems have threatened its effectiveness.

“Bigness”
While it has never obtained much traction in the legal literature,
the idea that antitrust should be concerned with corporate “bigness”
has been popular with the public since the beginning of the antitrust
movement, and continues to be so.15 It also has the populist rhetorical
advantage that it avoids the need for more refined assessment and can
make expertise unnecessary. For example, determining whether a
firm’s product dominates a properly defined relevant market can be a
quite technical exercise. Determining whether a firm is “big” need not
be.

13

See discussion infra, text at notes __.

14

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See, e.g., FRANK NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS: A STORY OF CALIFORNIA (1901);
TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW GILDED
AGE (2018).
15
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The stated concern is that “bigness” itself is the evil, often
ignoring many characteristics of large firms that are beneficial and
even essential to the economy and society. In this sense “bigness”
operates in populist antitrust rhetoric much like the word “immigrant”
does in right-wing populist political rhetoric,16 using a single term to
mask a complex phenomenon. The anti-immigrant rhetoric ignores
the fact that we are a nation of immigrants, that they have always been
central to American economic and social development and diversity,
and that new immigration is essential to economic growth. In the same
way, the large business firm has been a significant driver of American
economic growth, innovation, variety, opportunity, and consumer
welfare. There is no “curse” of bigness any more than there is a curse
of immigrants.
While pre-Sherman Act history is filled with rhetoric about
monopoly, as a a legal term it did not refer to firms of large size, but
rather to exclusive grants or privileges. For example, the 1623 British
Statute of Monopolies, often identified as the source of British antimonopoly law, did not identify its targets by size. Rather, it
condemned “commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and letters
patents” that conferred exclusive rights.17 Pre-Sherman Act common
law in both England and America did the same, never referencing large
firms as such, but rather products that enjoyed a state-granted
exclusive right. Indeed, many of the pre-Sherman Act decisions
discussing “monopoly” were in reference to small structures such as a
single toll bridge that may or may not have had an implied monopoly

16

See, e.g., Laura Finley & Luigi Esposito, The Immigrant as Bogeyman:
Examining Donald Trump and the Right’s Anti-immigrant Anti-PC Rhetoric,
44 HUMANITY AND SOCIETY 178 (2020)
17
English Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
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right.18 Even the “monopoly” conferred by a patent was often small.19
In any event, the patent “monopoly” applies to a particular product or
process, saying nothing about the size of its owner.
Nevertheless, fear of “bigness” is deeply rooted in antitrust’s
popular history. For example, Progressive novelist Frank Norris
presented a fictional California railroad as an “Octopus” in his 1901
novel of that title, with tentacles strangling many aspects of California
agriculture and politics.20 Ida Tarbell adopted the same metaphor in
her 1904 History of the Standard Oil Company.21 That same year Puck
magazine printed its famous Standard Oil Octopus cartoon, entitled
“Next,” depicting the Standard Octopus’s ominous and everexpanding dominance over American institutions, encircling even the
Capital:22

18

The most well known was Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. The
Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837), which considered
whether a grant of a charter for a toll bridge across the Charles River from
Boston to Cambridge implied a monopoly provision when none was stated
in the grant. The majority, speaking through Chief Justice Taney concluded
that in “grants by the public, nothing passes by implication”). The company
in question apparently owned only the one particular bridge. See Reporter’s
note, id. at 420, and the Chief Justice’s opinion, id. at 536-537.
19
E.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) (speaking of a patent
monopoly for an improvement in a coffin lid that enabled an identification
plate to be observed even when the lid was open).
20
Note __.
21
IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL CO. 182 (1904)
(speaking of Standard’s policy of buying up rivals, who “fell shivering with
dislike into the embrace of this commercial octopus….”).
22
Udo Keppler (cartoonist), “Next,” PUCK (Sep. 7, 1904), available online in
the
Theodore
Roosevelt
Digital
Library,
https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/DigitalLibrary/Record?libID=o277854.
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Other Progressive writers used that metaphor even earlier,23 as did
some courts,24 while still others called it into question.25

23

For example, the racist anti-Chinese cartoonist George Frederick Keller depicted
the California railroad system as an octopus in a cartoon entitled “The Curse of
California,” in 9 THE WASP 520 (1882). The image is in the digital archives of the
National Humanities Center, along with several other early cartoons (1882-1909)
portraying
the
large
firm
as
an
octopus. http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/gilded/power/text1/octopus
images.pdf. See also LYMAN HORACE WEEKS, THE OTHER SIDE 5 (1900)

(“Pulpit and platform, newspaper and magazine vied with each other in
condemning “the octopus,” as the trust came to be termed.”).
24

E.g., State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902, 1059
(1908) (state corporate law proceeding against Standard monopoly, “the greatest
octopus of all the trusts”); State v Racine Sattley Co., 63 Tex. Civ. App. 663, 134
S.W. 400, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
25

In 1900 Progressive economist John Bates Clark described the term
“octopus” as inadequate to describe the structural features of trusts. John
Bates Clark, Trusts, 15 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1900). See also Henry R. Hatfield,
The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1, 8 (1899) (noting the
accusation of “octopus” levied against the trusts but suspecting their validity
and suggesting that the term reflected “the American proclivity for finding
some convenient scape-goat on which any and all evils may be laid.”);
Norbert Heinsheimer, The Legal Status of Trusts, 2 COLUM. L. TIMES 51, 58
(1888) (denying that the trust was an octopus; rather it was simply a lower
cost way of organizing production).
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The Octopus metaphor was brilliant because it captured not
only size as such as a menace, but also expansion into secondary
markets and control of power in all places where power could be
maliciously exerted. The operational and sentient core was the
octupus’ body, while the mindless tentacles became its virtually
unlimited reach. For example, it was used decades later in opposition
to a firm’s vertical integration into related markets.26
The immense popularity of this rhetoric aside, one is hard
pressed to find a single antitrust decision that broke up or even
disciplined a large firm simply because it was too big. Indeed, early
antitrust decisions involving dominant firms typically read like tort
decisions, with heavy emphasis on numerous and diverse types of bad
conduct.27
Nor is there any coherent basis for attacking bigness as such in
the economics literature. Antitrust tests that target mere size do not
work if the goal of the antitrust law is to deliver higher output, lower
prices, greater consumer satisfaction, greater opportunities for labor,
or more innovation. The relationship between these things and firm
size is an empirical question, but there is certainly no general evidence
that any one of them suffers as firm size is larger. Much of the
evidence is to the contrary. Historically, most of the opposition to the
emergence of large firms has come from competitors complaining
about lower prices or innovations that harmed them.
Large firms often have lower costs and prices than smaller
firms. Indeed, that is a principal reason that trade associations made
up of smaller firm organized against them.28 For a century, large firms
26

See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)
(upholding state statute that prevented gasoline refineries from owning
service stations in the state; see id. 143 n. 8 (Blackmun, concurring and
dissenting in part, and noting that the octopus metaphor was used to describe
the practice of refineries acquiring their own retail stations; Justice Blackmun
presented this as evidence of legislative capture by the retailers).
27
See Hovenkamp, supra note 12.
28
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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have paid higher wages than small firms. Although that difference has
diminished in recent years, it remains substantial.29 Historically, larger
firms have also invested more in innovation than smaller firms.30 As
a result, stating the antitrust threat as “bigness” frequently reduces to
an attack on low prices, the well-being of consumers and labor, and
promotion of innovation as antitrust goals. Both consumer purchase
and labor are “variable” in the sense that both are highly responsive to
changes in output. Each is better off as output increases.31 The
protected class is typically smaller businesses or those that have not
modernized their technologies. To be sure, large size may create
opportunities for competitive behavior, but in that case the behavior
itself should be analyzed.
Size works better as a target if the goal is to protect higher cost
or less innovative producers. If a nondominant firm offers higher
prices or reduced quality, it will lose too many sales. The market
power requirement is designed to address this issue. However, a firm
that offers lower prices or greater innovation can injure higher cost or
less innovative rivals even if it is not dominant within its market. This
29

See Nicholas Bloom, Faith Guvenen, Benjamin S. Smith, Jae Song & Till
von Wachter, Is the Large Firm Wage Premium Dead or Merely Resting?,
108 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 317 (2018); Emanuele Colonnelli,
Joacim Tåg, Michael Webb & Stefanie Wolter, A Cross-Country
Comparison of Dynamics in the Large Firm Wage Premium (Rsch. Inst. of
Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 1196, 2018).
30
See Julian Baumann & Alexander S. Kritikos, The link between R&D,
innovation and productivity: Are micro firms different?, 45 RSCH. POL’Y
1263 (2016); Dirk Czarnitzki & Hanna Hottenrott, R&D investment and
financing constraints of small and medium-sized firms, 36 SMALL BUS.
ECON. 65 (2011); cf. David B. Audretsch, Marian Hafenstein, Alexander
Kritikos & Alexander Schiersch, Firm Size and Innovation in the Service
Sector (DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1774, 2018) (acknowledging
innovation advantages of large firm size in manufacturing but finding the
difference
insubstantial
in
provision
of
services),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3299312.
31
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Worker Welfare and Antitrust, 90 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4015834.
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was true of the chain stores, for example, who drove many independent
retailers out of business even though they had individually
nondominant market shares.32 In the 1930s even A&P, the large
grocery chain that provoked Congress to pass the Robinson-Patman
Act, accounted for less than 10% of the national market for purchasing
of food for grocery sales. Its share was not more than 20% in any
regional market.33 As a result, the value of bigness tests depends on
one’s a priori selection of a goal for antitrust policy. Targeting
“bigness” as such usually benefits competitors at the expense of
consumers and labor.
United States antitrust law has been consistent that large size
alone cannot be an antitrust offense.34 Further, an antitrust policy of
condemning “bigness” is not the same thing as a policy of reducing the
amount of market power in the economy. To be sure, firm size and
market power are correlated in the sense that once a market is defined,
size within that market reflects power. But looking at size alone never
gets us there. For example, Chrysler as automobile producer is
thousands of times larger than the only swimming pool contractor in
Ozona, Texas, an isolated community of fewer than 3000 people. But
this contractor may wield more market power to the extent that those
32

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See Maurice A. Adelman, Dirlam and Kahn on the A & P Case, 61 J. POL.
ECON. 436, 438 (1953).
34
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920)
(“[T]he law does not make mere size an offense . . . .”); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 430 n.2 (2d Cir. 1945)
(quoting U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 451); see also United States v. Int’l Harvester
Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927) (“[Antitrust law] does not make the mere
size of a corporation, however impressive, or the existence of unexerted
power on its part, an offense, when unaccompanied by unlawful conduct.”);
cf. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948) (holding
“mere size” of a patent pool was not grounds for condemnation under the
Sherman Act). Among more recent decisions, see, e.g., Viamedia, Inc. v.
Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 451 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting the “mere size”
statement from U.S. Steel and adding that “judicial decisions interpreting
Section 2 have long held that simple possession of monopoly power, or the
pursuit of it, is not in itself illegal”).
33
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wishing to install swimming pools in Ozona have no good alternatives.
Chrysler must compete with Ford, GM, Toyota, Nissan, and others.
Notwithstanding its much larger size, Chrysler has much less market
power.
The functional difference between “market power” and
“bigness” as targets of antitrust is that the market power requirement
is directly linked to the threat of higher prices or reduced market
output. Market power technically defined is the ability to profit by
raising prices above cost.35 “Bigness” and higher prices or reduced
output are not correlated in this fashion.
Brandeis: Protection of Small Firms and Old Technologies
In a famous dissent in Liggett v. Lee, Justice Brandeis justified
the use of discriminatory taxes designed to slow the growth of chain
stores because of their large size:
Businesses may become as harmful to the community by
excessive size, as by monopoly or the commonly recognized
restraints of trade. If the state should conclude that bigness in
retail merchandising as manifested in corporate chain stores
menaces the public welfare, it might prohibit the excessive size
or extent of that business as it prohibits excessive size or weight
in motor trucks36 or excessive height in the buildings of a city.37

35

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).
36
This is a likely reference to Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933)
(upholding state law licensing trucks and taxing them based on weight).
37
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 574 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). The reference to the height of buildings was very likely to Welch
v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (upholding statute regulating maximum
heights of buildings), or else Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning law that included height restrictions).
For contemporary criticism, see J. Edward Collins, Anti-Chain Store
Legislation, 24 CORNELL L. REV. 198 (1939).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121866

2022

Antitrust Slogans Goals

15

Justice Brandeis viewed the regulation of firm size as not all
that different from regulating the weight of trucks or the height of
buildings. Most notable was his belief that the chain stores should be
limited in size even though monopoly was not in prospect and the
chains had not engaged in restraints of trade.
The harms flowing from large corporations that Justice
Brandeis enumerated included “encroachment upon the liberties and
opportunities of the individual,“ fear of “the subjection of labor to
capital,” fear of monopoly, and fear “that the absorption of capital by
corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring evils “similar to
those which attended mortmain.”38 There was also an unspecified
“sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of
capital, particularly when held by corporations.”39
Brandeis was correct that historically business corporation
laws “embodied severe restrictions upon size and scope of corporate
activity,” and perhaps even as an “expression of the desire for equality
of opportunity.”40 Brandeis then lamented that states had gradually
removed these restrictions on corporate size.41 Large size and their
management needs in turn resulted in the transfer of economic power
away from owners (stockholders) and toward managers, as well as
corporations that were able to dominate the economies and politics of
their states.42 He concluded that “size alone gives to giant corporations
Liggett, 288 U.S. at 548. “Mortmain” was the English system of feudal
land ownership in which the land itself was held in perpetuity, often by the
Church, and all occupants served as tenants of various classes.
39
Id.
40
Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American
Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1658-80 (1988) (pointing out that during
the Jackson administration the corporation was democratized so that nearly
anyone could incorporate).
41
Liggett, 288 U.S. at 550-564 (elaborating on the removal of size limitations
in many states but particularly New Jersey and New York) (citing ADOLF A.
BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932)).
42
Liggett, 288 U.S. at 564-566.
38
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a social significance not attached ordinarily to smaller units of private
enterprise.”43
While more permissive corporate law permitting larger firms
originated in the states, federal antitrust law has consistently gone
along. Section 8 of the original Sherman Act provided that a
corporation was to be regarded as a single “person,” and placed no
limits on state power to permit corporations of any size or in any area
of activity. It required only that they be lawfully organized under state
law.44 In 1888 New Jersey amended its corporate law to permit
“holding companies,” or one corporation’s acquisition and ownership
of the shares of another.45 The holding company became a powerful
tool for corporate mergers. The government’s first big antitrust merger
case was against a railroad merger formed through a New Jersey
holding company.46 Other states began to follow New Jersey.47 In 1932
James C. Bonbright and Gardiner Means, authors of the leading
treatise of the day on holding companies, concluded that “nearly all”
of the states had amended their corporation laws so as to permit them.48

43

Id. at 565.
The original § 8 of the Sherman Act provided:
That the word "person," or " persons," wherever used in this act shall
be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of
the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign
country.
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
45
See N.J. Laws, 385, 445 (1888); see also Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey
and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1899).
46
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 317 (1904)
(condemning the merger and holding that “the device of a holding
corporation for the purpose of circumventing the law” was ineffectual to
circumvent federal antitrust law).
47
Justice Brandeis provided a thumbnail history in Liggett, 288 U.S. at 556
n. 32 (1933).
48
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY,
ITS PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE, AND ITS REGULATION 57 (1932). See generally
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1669-72 (1988).
44
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While opposition to holding companies was part of the 1912 Democrat
Presidential antitrust Platform, no provision was ever enacted and the
states ignored it. Indeed, President Wilson’s Congress enacted most
of the proposals in the Democrat’s antitrust Platform, but not that
one.49 The Progressive Era Congress and Wilson himself doubled
down on the Sherman Act formulation, re-enacting it verbatim in §1
of the Clayton Act, where it remains today.50 Brandeis may have found
the situation lamentable, but neither state nor federal law paid much
attention.
This underappreciated statutory definition of a single
“person” to include corporations has generally determined the dividing
line between intrafirm “unilateral” conduct and the conduct of those
related to one another by contract. For example, the corporate law
change that permitted holding companies entailed that an arrangement
between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary would be regarded as
a unilateral act rather than a conspiracy.51
Brandeis was not very specific about the types of harms that
chain stores threatened. His fears about “encroachment upon liberties”
appear to be untethered rhetorical flourish, given that the only threat
was from multi-store retailers who were successful precisely because
consumers liked them. In any event, the contemporary political
49

See DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM OF 1912 (1912), archived at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1912-democratic-partyplatform (“We favor the declaration by law of the conditions upon which
corporations shall be permitted to engage in interstate trade, including,
among others, the prevention of holding companies . . . .”). The Platform
also called for limitations on interlocking directors, which was adopted in
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 19, and further limitations on price
discrimination, which were adopted in Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13. See
discussion infra, text at notes __.
50
15 U.S.C. § 12.
51
See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984) (holding a parent corporation and wholly owned subsidiary are a
single person for Sherman Act purposes). But see, e.g., American Needle,
Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (holding firms in a joint venture but linked
by contract could conspire).
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movement was frenzied. Several states passed anti-chain legislation
in the mid-twenties, and the Depression sharply accelerated the trend.
Between 1931 and 1937 twenty-six states passed such laws.52 During
that period Congress also passed the Robinson-Patman Act, intended
to limit the growth of large retailers by restricting their ability to obtain
or to charge lower prices,53 and also the Miller-Tydings Act,54
designed to protect smaller retailers from price cutters by enabling
states to permit resale price maintenance, or “fair trade.”55 The
common goal of all of this legislation was to protect the traditional
family-owned single store retailer from the competition of larger firms.
Populist demagogue Huey Long was one of the early prominent
promotors of progressive chain tax legislation,56 proclaiming that he
would “rather have thieves and gangsters than chain stores in
Louisiana.”57
The chain stores rarely threatened monopoly. First, there
were many of them and they competed with each other.58 Second, they
never came close to occupying a monopoly position in the retail

52

Daniel Scroop, The Anti-Chain Store Movement and the Politics of
Consumption, 60 AM. Q. 925, 925 (2008).
53
15 U.S.C. § 13. See discussion infra, text at notes __.
54
Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937). The
Act was repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)).
55
LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY
CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE ‘NEW COMPETITION,’ 1890-1940
(2018); JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION
235-54 (1955). For contemporary reaction and analysis, see Note, Resale
Price Maintenance: The Miller-Tydings Enabling Act, 51 HARV. L. REV. 336
(1937).
56
Carl G. Ryant, The South and the Movement Against Chain Stores, 39 J. S.
HIST. 207, 213 (1973).
57
Carl H. Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, the Struggle Between
Independents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1951).
58
FREDERICK JOHN HARPER, THE ANTI-CHAIN STORE MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1927-1940, at 1-2 (1981) (noting estimates that there were
3000 competing chains, defined as four or more stores, in 1900 but 95,386
chains by 1929).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121866

2022

Antitrust Slogans Goals

19

markets where they sold.59 They did, however, severely injure the
previous generation of single-store operators.60
Justice Brandeis acknowledged that the aggregations of capital
that corporations produced were “once merely an efficient tool” for
conducting private business.61 While conceding that larger firms can
be more efficient he concluded from this that they “can, and should,
contribute more to the public revenues.”62 He added, however, that
“the state need not rest the difference in tax rates on a ground so
debatable as the assertion that efficiency increases with size.”63
Brandeis failed to acknowledge that one purpose of the chain
store taxes was not simply to make them pay their fair share, but to
drive them out of business entirely. A few years later Representative
Wright Patman and seventy-five Congressional co-sponsors proposed
“death sentence” legislation that would have done exactly that.64 The
entire chain store episode represent an enormous failure of democratic
processes, in which legislatures paid little attention to consumers who

59

Id. at 3-4 (finding chain stores represented 4% of total retailing in 1921,
grew to 16% by 1927 and to 20% by 1929, and, after that, slowing).
60
On the history and development of the numerous chains and their threats
to small merchants, see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive
Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (2005); Fulda, supra note
57.
61
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
62
Id. at 573.
63
Id. at 572-73.
64
See HARPER, supra note 58, at 322, 387 (“The ‘death sentence’ component
to the schedule was a multiplier provision whereby the total tax was to be
multiplied by the number of states including the District of Columbia, in
which the chain had its stores. Thus a chain like the R. W. Woolworth Co.
operating in every state would be liable to a tax of $49,000 on each of its
stores in excess of 500.”); 80 CONG. REC. 8133 (1938); 84 CONG. REC. 345347 (1940); Excise Tax on Retail Stores: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the H.
Ways & Means Comm., 76th Cong. 115 (1940).
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were voting with their feet and listened to small retailer associations
that were much better organized.
Liggett v. Lee was not an antitrust case but rather a challenge
to a state taxation law. Before long, however, the political movement
against chain stores would become an antitrust issue with passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,65 although it was preceded by state
legislation as early as 1913.66 The Robinson-Patman Act was pure
interest group legislation, passed at the behest of the United States
Wholesale Grocer Association. Its General Counsel Henry B.
Teegarden drafted the bill67 and was heavily involved in the amending
process.68
The antitrust movement against the chains presents interesting
similarities to the twenty-first century movement against the large
digital platforms, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, and
Meta (Facebook). First, its origins were largely populist, ignoring
much of the economics of business organization and innovation.
Second, it was a largely reactionary response to significant innovations
in retailing and distribution that seriously injured firms committed to
older methods.69 Among these was a dramatic reduction in the demand
for independent “brokers,” or intermediaries that were important to
65

15 U.S.C. § 13.
See Ewald T. Grether, Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 1
J. MARKETING 344 (1937); Ewald T. Grether, Note, Experience in California
with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CAL. L. REV. 640
(1936).
67
See Prohibition on Price Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 8442 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong. 9 (1935) (“Mr. Teegarden wrote
this bill.”); see also PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 55, at 197-198 (noting
Teegarden’s authorship of the bill).
68
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 114 (1978). For more on Teegarden’s role, see Cecil E. Weller, Jr.,
Joseph Taylor Robinson and the Robinson-Patman Act, 47 ARK. HIST. Q. 29
(1988), and Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the
Fate of Morton Salt: To Save it, Let it Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1071-76
(1999).
69
See, e.g., Fulda, supra note 57.
66
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small retailers but often absorbed into the vertically integrated
operations of the chains.70 Third, the movement rested on heavily
exaggerated theories of harm as well as poor analysis of the problem.
This became particularly apparent with passage of the RobinsonPatman Act.
Finally, the debate was heavily driven by interest group
politics.71 The movement was supported by established merchants and
those with older technologies but who were well organized politically.
It rarely offered any benefits to consumers and labor, the other two
interest groups most seriously affected. Very largely for this reason
the anti-chain store movement withered after a few years in the face of
overwhelming consumer choice.72 Whether that also happens with the
anti-digital platform movement is too early to say.
Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Liggett was included in an edited
collection of his writings published in 1934 as The Curse of Bigness.73
70

Id. at 1065-68. Brokerage limitations were enacted into the RobinsonPatman Act (“RPA”). See 15 U.S.C. § 13(c); Federal Trade Commission v.
Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960) (holding a food broker who reduced
his commission to close a sale violated the RPA).
71
See, e.g., PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 55, at 159-87; Harper, supra note 58,
at ii (describing trade associations as akin to “medieval guilds”). They often
campaigned for regulation preventing individual store expansion (e.g.,
prohibiting green grocers from selling bread). Many of these trade
association activities were expressly sanctioned by the National Recovery
Administration during the New Deal. See Harper, supra note 58, at iii; see
also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) (refusing to modify
earlier Sherman Act consent decree so as to permit large meat packer from
selling other groceries, at the behest of the American Wholesale Grocers’
Association).
72
See Paul Ingram & Hayagreeva Rao, Store Wars: The Enactment and
Repeal of Anti-Chain-Store Legislation in America, 110 AM. J. SOC. 446
(2004); see also PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 55, at 183-199 (noting growth
of chains notwithstanding the movement).
73
See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), reprinted in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel & Clarence M. Lewis eds.,
1934).
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Nearly all of the selections except for two Supreme Court dissents
were written prior to his appointment to the Court in 1916. The other
dissent that the authors selected was in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman.74 The majority struck down an Oklahoma statute that
required commercial ice producers to obtain a license, which required
proof of “public convenience and necessity.”75 Justice Brandeis
rationalized this requirement by arguing that ice production included
equipment that was subject to interest on loans and depreciation. As a
result, the success of a business depended on the volume of trade that
each firm obtained. The purpose of this requirement was to “protect
the public interest by preventing waste.”76 Of course, any industry with
fixed costs would fall into that category. Second, he observed that
Oklahoma had declared the business of producing ice to be a “public
utility.”77 Justice Brandeis said little about the merits of this
declaration other than the fact that ice should be healthy, but he
observed that the declaration of which industries are public utilities is
a prerogative of the state.78
The ice licensing requirements had been created at the behest
of the National Association of Ice Industries, an interest group of
independent ice producers organized into separate state associations.
At the time of the litigation the Associations’ members controlled 84%
of the ice commercially produced in the United States.79 Some states

74

285 U.S. 262 (1932).
Id. at 281-82 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76
Id. He continued, “The introduction in the United States of the certificate
of public convenience and necessity marked the growing conviction that
under certain circumstances free competition might be harmful to the
community, and that, when it was so, absolute freedom to enter the business
of one's choice should be denied.” Id.
77
Id. at 283.
78
Id. at 284.
79
Brief for Petitioner, New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932),
1932 WL 33240, at *27-28.
75
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had even gone so far as to regulate the price of ice.80 One concern of
the Association was ice sales from ice “peddlers,” or travelling sales
agents that gave large ice plants a bigger delivery range.81 They
emerged as the market experienced rapid growth in the 1920s through
the development of cheaper electric ice plants that typically undersold
established producers. The result was that the industry experienced
excess capacity just as it was on the verge of collapsing.82
In addition to combatting the peddlers, the ice industry also
used other means to restrict output. For example, the FTC’s 1925
Report on trade associations observed that one trade association rule
made it “unethical” for a truck delivering ice cream to also sell ice.83
The harm there seems clear: given substantial joint costs for
equipment, the cost of delivering ice and ice cream together from the
same vehicle undoubtedly was lower than the cost of delivering each
one separately.
The more imposing and ultimately fatal threat to the ice
industry was not the peddlers, however, but rather electric

80

See Southwest Utility Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 52 F.2d 349, 355 (10th Cir.
1931) (noting that Arkansas and Oklahoma regulated ice prices and including
a description of the industry).
81
On the role of peddlers, see State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People’s Ice, Storage
& Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168 (1912) (sustaining a quo warranto claim that large
ice companies who employed peddlers were attempting to monopolize
market).
82
See L. B. Breedlove, The Ice Industry: Its Economies and Future, 8 J.
LAND & PUB. UTILITY ECON. 234 (1932). For fact findings in the lower
court, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 42 F.2d 913, 917-18 (1930) (“[I]t is
clearly shown the act of the Legislature here under consideration in its actual
operation and effect has had the result in many cities and towns of the state
of absolutely destroying all competition in the manufacture and distribution
of ice . . . [andl enhancing the price charged . . . .”).
83
FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON OPEN-PRICE TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
306 (1925) [hereinafter Open-Price Trade Associations Report],
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b46743&view=1up&seq=9&skin
=2021.
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refrigeration.84 The traditional means of refrigeration had been ice
harvested from frozen lakes or, a little later, manufactured in plants.85
The mechanical refrigerator, which was first introduced into retail
establishments and a little later into homes in the early twentieth
century, threatened that dominance.86 In his 1922 presidential address
to the Association of Ice Industries, President J.G. Black called the
electric refrigerator a “menace” that needed to be controlled. “There
are some places and conditions,” he warned, “where a machine will
render a more satisfactory service than we can hope to with ice.”87 The
ice industry pursued various strategies, including long term contracts
on subsidized ice boxes, intended to lock customers into the older ice
technology.88
Like the chain store, however, the electric refrigerator was
simply too attractive to the typical consumer, who “wants the
84

For a good brief history of the industry, see A. R. Stevenson, Jr.,
Refrigeration, 208 J. FRANKLIN INST. 143 (1919).
85
See Andrew Robichaud, Frozen Over: Making Ice and Knowing Nature in
Nineteenth-Century America, 27 ENV’T HIST. 519 (2022).
86
See JONATHAN REES, REFRIGERATION NATION: A HISTORY OF ICE,
APPLIANCES, AND ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA (2013) (detailing the rise of
American mechanical refrigerator, its introduction into American homes
early in the twentieth century, and the decline of the ice industry).
87
See J.G. Black, President, Nat’l Assoc. of Ice Indus., President’s Address
(Oct. 11, 1922), in PROC. OF THE FIFTH ANN. CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L
ASSOC. OF ICE INDUS., at 36; Breedlove, supra note 82 at 237, 240 (noting,
in 1932, the significant extent of mechanical refrigerator encroachment on
the ice industry); Lisa Mae Robinson, Safeguarded by Your Refrigerator:
Mary Engle Pennington’s Struggle with the National Association of Ice
Industries, in RETHINKING HOME ECONOMICS: WOMEN AND THE HISTORY
OF A PROFESSION (Sarah Stage & Virginia B. Vincenti eds., 1997).
Commercial cooling of building interiors exhibited a similar war between ice
and condensation technology and electric air conditioning. See Bernard
Nagengast, A History of Comfort Cooling Using Ice, 1999 ASHRAE J 49.
88
See Rich Ling & Oscar Westlund, Cold Comfort: Lessons for the TwentyFirst Century Newspaper Industry from the Twentieth Century Industry, 4
MEDIA
INDUS.
#2
(2017),
online
at
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/mij/15031809.0004.202?view=text;rgn=main
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automatic refrigerator and will buy it as soon as the family budget will
permit.”89
Two things about Brandeis’s dissents stand out. First is the
extent to which he aligned his interests with small firms, even those
committed to obsolete distribution methods and technologies, and at
the expense of consumers and others who benefit from more robustly
competitive and innovative markets. The second is that his concern
about bigness was limited to large individual firms. He disregarded
the much more substantial threat posed by trade associations.90 In both
the chain store situation and the ice industry situation the real threat to
competition came not from large individual firms, but from
associations of small firms who had substantial political power to
compensate for their lack of productive efficiency or technology. For
example, the FTC’s 1925 Report on trade Associations concluded that
virtually all of the associations were involved in lobbying for
legislation.91
Brandeis’ Efficiency Dilemma
Brandeis’s hostility to chains and other large sellers reflected
an antinomy in his own beliefs about business efficiency. In a 1914
address to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce he acknowledged that firms
can attain greater efficiency through growth. However, they reached
maximum efficiency “at a fairly early stage.” From that point “the
disadvantages of size outweigh in many respects the advantage of
size.”92 The one advantage that the large firm continued to hold, he
argued, was in the “collection and getting of knowledge.”93 Within
89

Breedlove, supra note 82 at 241.
On Brandeis’ protective views toward trade associations, see M. Browning
Carrott, The Supreme Court and American Trade Associations, 1921-1925,
44 BUS. HIST. REV. 320 (1970). See discussion infra, text at notes __.
91
See Open-Price Trade Associations Report, supra note 83, at 243-44.
92
The address was published as “The Democracy of Business.” See LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS, The Democracy of Business, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 137, 140 (Osmond K.
Fraenkel & Clarence M. Lewis eds., 1934) [hereinafter Curse of Bigness].
93
Id.
90
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this he also included research laboratories, which “can be maintained
only by great concerns.”94
For Brandeis, most efficiency came not from size but rather
from management. He was an enthusiastic follower of “Taylorism,” or
“scientific management,” which attempted to instruct firms in cost
reducing or time saving processes.95 In 1914 he argued to the shortlived United States Commission on Industrial Relations that organized
labor should embrace scientific management. They could be induced
to do so by a “fair distribution of profits,” together with ongoing
participation of labor in the development of efficient methods.96 “If
labor is given such representation, I am unable to find anything in
scientific management which is not strictly consistent” with their
interests.
Efficiency expert Frederick Winslow Taylor’s ideas about cost
savings were not rooted in economic industrial organization theory,
but rather in the mechanical economics of business management,
standardized cost accounting,97 assembly line production, repetition,
and labor specialization.98 This emphasis led to an alternative

94

Id.
See Louis D. Brandeis, Organized Labor and Efficiency, 41 ADVOC. 567
(1911). On Brandeis and Taylorism, see Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis
Gambit: The Making of America’s “First Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 557 (1999), and Richard P. Adelstein, “Islands of Conscious
Power”: Louis D. Brandeis and the Modern Corporation, 63 BUS. HIST.
REV. 614 (1989).
96
See Louis D. Brandeis, Efficiency Systems and Labor, Senate Document,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 991-1011 (April 16, 1914), extracted in HARPER’S
WEEKLY 154 (Aug. 15, 1914), in Curse of Bigness, supra note 92, at 48, 49.
97
See Leslie S. Oakes & Paul J. Miranti, Louis D. Brandeis and Standard
Cost Accounting: A Study of the Construction of Historical Agency, 21
ACCT., ORG. AND SOC’Y 569 (1996) (describing how Brandeis’ advocacy of
scientific management to the railroads contributed to standardized cost
accounting norms).
98
See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT (1911).
95
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“industrial organization” literature more aligned with schools of
business management and systems engineering than with economics.99
Brandeis was a lifelong supporter of labor. One irony,
however, is that his preferred approach to efficiency almost certainly
produced more alienation and disaffection among labor than did large
firm size or vertical integration.100 For example, Dexter Kimball’s
popular 1913 text on “industrial organization,” written by an engineer
rather than an economist, lamented the “degradation of labor” that
resulted from Taylorite methods.101
Brandeis’ niece, Josephine Goldmark, took Brandeis’ side in
her 1912 book, Fatigue and Efficiency.102 She defended Taylor’s
efforts to improve efficiency through the use of timed, repetitive
motions that she believed enabled workers to produce the same amount
with less energy, and thus less fatigue.103 She appeared to assume that
employers would respond to this increased efficiency by giving labor
more leisure rather than simply increasing output expectations.
One particular feature of the Taylorite theories of industrial
organization was de-emphasis of large firm size as an important factor
in business growth. For example, the third edition of Kimball’s
Industrial Organization text concluded that management costs went
up disproportionately as firms became larger. As a result there was
“reason to believe that many” large firms “have passed the point where
99

See, e.g., DEXTER KIMBALL, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
(1913 ed., 1925) (discussing the organization of industry in Taylorite terms).
See also John Lee, Industrial Organization (1923) (same, British). For a good
contemporary assessment, see C. Bertrand Thompson, The Literature of
Scientific Management, 28 Q. J. ECON. 506 (1914).
100
See, e.g., HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE
DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1998). On
Taylorism in the digital economy, see Brishen Rogers, The Law and Political
Economy of Workplace Technological Change, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
531 (2020).
101
KIMBALL, supra note 99, at 17-29.
102
JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY (1912).
103
Id. at 195-200.
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any great gain in productive efficiency can be had through further
division of labor and the use of labor-saving machinery.”104 On the
other hand, he spoke favorably about vertical integration, which he
saw as helping firms assure their supply and position their production
best so as to meet their needs.105 At one point he talked about the cost
of marketing as a “disgrace to our intelligence,” but did not suggest
shifts to internal production as an alternative.106 His few references to
vertical control applied almost exclusively to labor management
issues.107
Labor would have none of it. Taylorism was one area in which
Brandeis and organized labor, which was righteously opposed to
scientific management, were perpetually at odds.108 Taylorism
emphasized cost savings from duplication and rote repetitive motion,
with workers assigned a narrow range of tasks that they performed
over and over. Progressive labor economist John R. Commons
described the object of Taylorism as
not that of a substitute machine, but an analysis of the very
motions that constitute the skill itself; the breaking up of these
motions into their elementary parts; the elimination of waste
motions and the selection of time-saving motions; the timing
of each motion by a stop watch, and the recording of both timesaving motions and their standard times on instruction sheets,
by which almost any unskilled laborer can learn quickly to do
the work.109
In 1916 the United States Commission on Industrial Relations
published a study of the issue, authored by Robert Hoxie, a political
104

KIMBALL, supra note 99, at 54 (3d ed. 1925).
Id. at 35.
106
Id. at 425.
107
Id. at 94 (describing the relationship between workers, foremen,
superintendents and general managers).
108
See Oscar Kraines, Brandeis’ Philosophy of Scientific Management, 13
W. POL. Q. 191 (1960).
109
John R. Commons, Book Review, 21 AM. J. SOCIO. 688, 688 (1916).
105
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economist from the University of Chicago. Hoxie’s study came to
mixed conclusions, but generally more aligned with those of
Commons.110 One of his most important observations was that because
of its emphasis on rote repetitive motion, scientific management
tended to prefer unskilled work over that of the tradesmen, in the
process leading to lower wages. Ultimately, he concluded, scientific
management was good for firms but bad for labor.111 He did believe
that many of the problems were correctable through greater labor
participation in workplace decisions.112
One thing Taylorism did offer was at least a partial escape from
size. By advocating repetitive and standardized processes rather than
large scale production, Taylorism was able to present a mechanism for
achieving efficiency without the need for large firms. Brandeis was
swimming against the tide, however. For example, the chain stores
themselves were also followers of scientific management,113 and they
found substantial savings that accrued to multistore operations.114 For
example, by changing management policies and merging wholesale
and retail functions, the chain stores were able to distribute at lower
costs than independents could do.115 Advocates of scientific
management could believe that it was these managerial cost savings
rather than larger size that explained the success of the chains.116

110

ROBERT F. HOXIE, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND LABOR (1916).
Id. at 138.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., WALTER S. HAYWARD & PERCIVAL WHITE, CHAIN STORES:
THEIR MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION, at ii, 94 (1925) (applying principles
of scientific management to operation of retail chains).
114
See, e.g., A.W. Zelomek, The New Trend in Distribution, 24 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N. 425 (1925); Malcolm D. Taylor, Progressive Scientific Management,
in 209 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 46 (1940)
115
Taylor, supra note 98, at 53.
116
Id. at 51. However, much of what Taylor described actually referenced
economies of scale. For example, “Expert buyers are employed at large
salaries-salaries that in most cases the store under one roof could not afford
to pay-yet the buying cost per store is small.” Id.
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Brandeis had a difficult time believing that large firms
undersold smaller ones because they had lower costs. Rather, he
argued in Taylorite fashion, firms actually grew too large to be
economical.117 He professed no concern whatsoever about a firm’s
“natural” growth.118 By contrast, growth to a very large size was
“unnatural,” in that it was achieved by antitrust violations, including
anticompetitive mergers that enabled firms to grow to a size where
they actually had higher costs.119
Brandeis’ view of the relationship between large enterprise and
efficiency provides some insight into why the Robinson-Patman Act
was such a dismal failure. It largely sidestepped the true reasons that
the chains were attractive to so many customers, particularly in lower
income ranges. The imagined reasons were not related to economies
of scale or vertical integration, but rather discriminatory pricing. That
theory commanded much more political energy than economic
validity.
The Robinson-Patman Act pictured the chain store problem
almost exclusively in terms of pricing rather than structure or scale.
Further, the focus had shifted from the concern with predatory pricing
expressed during the Progressive Era and manifested in original §2 of
the Clayton Act.120 At that time it was thought that selective predatory
pricing was an important tool for excluding competitors. Because it

117

See BRANDEIS, CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 92, at 135. On this point,
see Comment, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition and Smallness: A Dilemma
Re-Examined, 66 YALE L.J. 69, 72 (1956).
118
See id. at 114 (“[T]here is nothing in our industrial history to indicate that
there is any need whatever to limit the natural growth of a business in order
to preserve competition”); see also id. at 109 (“[C]ompetition is in no sense
inconsistent with large scale production and distribution”).
119
Id. at 105, 124-131.
120
As a result, the Act had been held not to reach price discrimination as
between two different resellers. See, e.g., Mermen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774
(2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923). However, a few years later
the Court changed its mind. See George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can
Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
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was selective it was also discriminatory, in that the perpetrator was
thought to finance predation in one area by charging higher prices in
other areas.
The 1930s focus moved to the idea that the large chains grew
as they did because they were able to force suppliers to sell to them at
lower prices than smaller stores obtained. Advocates described this as
a “subsidy” favoring the larger retailers. Congressman John G.
Utterback of Maine, Chair of the House Subcommittee on the
Robinson-Patman Act, believed that the Act was intended to permit
one firm to receive a benefit that placed a burden on other firms. For
example, if two purchasers were competing sellers and
the price to one is so low as to involve a sacrifice of some part
of the seller's necessary costs and profit as applied to that
business, it leaves that deficit inevitably to be made up in
higher prices to his other customers; and there, too, a
relationship may exist upon which to base the charge of
discrimination.121
The FTC followed this pattern in early RPA decisions such as
Champion Spark Plug (1939), where it alleged that as a result of
differential prices those paying the higher price were forced to support
other buyers who paid less.122 The FTC’s own study of the chain stores
in 1934 concluded that the ability to receive lower buying prices
accounted for part of the difference between chain store and single
store prices.123 It also acknowledged, however, that much of the
121

80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936).
See Complaint, Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Docket No. 3977 (Dec.
22, 1939), available at 4 Fed. Reg. 4929; John T. Haslett, Price
Discriminations and the Justifications Under the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936, 46 MICH. L. REV. 450, 457-458 (1948) (quoting Champion Spark Plug
and other complaints).
123
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE
INVESTIGATION 53-59 (1934) [hereinafter Chain Store Report]. The Report
concluded only that overall advantages in purchasing prices accounted for
9% to 10% of the price differences between chains and independents; the
122
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savings resulted from large scale purchasing. For example, speaking
of wholesale grocers it observed that single store operators who
organized into cooperatives for purchasing could make up an
“appreciable proportion” of these price differences.124
Many of the suspicious practices were concessions given to
larger operators who performed certain functions for themselves,
including advertising,125 brokerage, and freight.126 While
discriminatory pricing was a factor, the Report concluded that the
“integration of the functions of manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer”
were very important as well.127 The Report also observed that the
Chains operated at lower margins than independents did.128
The FTC’s orientation toward protection of consumers
frequently placed it into conflict with the Brandeis vision that was
always on the lookout for small firms. For example, the FTC Study
concluded that lower income people used the chains more than higher
income patrons.129 That difference later emerged as a significant
variable in the question of why the poor and people of color paid more
for food in both inner city and rural areas, reflecting chain store

balance came from other sources.
See Morr A. Adelman, Price
Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General’s Report, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 222, 233-234 (1955); Terry Calvani, Government Enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 921 (1985).
124
CHAIN STORE REPORT, supra note 123, at 56-57.
125
See id. at 86 (“Chains in many lines possess an important advantage
through their ability to use newspaper advertising where the independent
retailer cannot afford to do so. Moreover, the newspaper advertising of the
chains tends to be much more effective than that of the independents owing
to the multiple outlets of the chains . . . .”).
126
Id. at 60.
127
Id. at 66.
128
Id. at 68.
129
Id. at 66.
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preferences to locate in the suburbs.130 Inner city residents were
largely relegated to small single store operators.
In contrast to the Brandeis view, the Chain Store Report also
advocated strongly against the graduated state taxes on chains,131
concluding that the “consuming public” would end up paying them.132
It expressed particular opposition to taxation efforts intended to drive
chains out of business:
To tax out of existence the advantages of chain stores over
competitors is to tax out of existence the advantage which the
consuming public have found in patronizing them, with a
consequent addition to the cost of living for that section of the
public.133
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) in 1936,
ignoring much of the FTC’s Report. The Act misfired badly. It
ignored both economies of scale and vertical integration, which
accounted for a large portion of chain store growth, and focused
exclusively on prices, although with low prices rather than high ones
being the evil.
The statute’s myopic focus on pricing led it to be a significant
inducement to further vertical integration. The RPA applies only to
“sales” and required that both the higher priced and the lower priced
transaction be sales to independent entities. Transfers between the
divisions or subsidiaries of a single firm were not covered.134 As a
result, a firm that was already vertically integrated could avoid the Act
130

See, e.g., Judith Bell & Bonnie Maria Burlin, In Urban Areas: Many of
the Poor Still Pay More for Food, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y MKTG 268 (Robert N.
Mayer & Debra L. Scammon eds., 1993) (biggest variable was lack of chain
stores in inner city areas).
131
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
132
See CHAIN STORE REPORT, supra note 123, at 81-82.
133
Id. at 91.
134
On this requirement, see 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 2312 (4th ed. 2020).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121866

2022

Antitrust Slogans Goals

34

with respect to all transfers within the integrated part of the firm. For
example, if a chain owned its own dairies, farms, processing plants or
delivery trucks transfers among these entities were not “sales” under
the Act. Further, the threat of liability for sales induced firms to
vertically integrate so they could avoid RPA liability – obviously not
the result that the Act’s framers intended.135 To the extent that vertical
ownership reduced a firm’s costs it provided a double benefit: not only
was it justifiable on its own terms, but it also became a means of
avoiding RPA liability. In other situations, firms avoided the Act by
simply refusing to deal with smaller, higher cost buyers.136 The courts
found these refusals to be lawful.137 In any event, the chain stores
experienced rapid growth, not very much hindered by the RobinsonPatman Act.138
The RPA was a lamentable use of antitrust to target large firm
size without understanding the economic issues. It represents little
more than capture by small firms or those dedicated to the preservation
of obsolete business methods or technology. In the process, such
protections are disdainful of consumers and labor, the two largest
interest groups that benefit from high output and low prices.
Anti-Bigness Beyond Brandeis
Justice Douglas, who succeeded to Justice Brandeis’ seat on
the Supreme Court in 1939, also cited concerns about bigness without
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See, e.g., Marius Schwartz, The Perverse Effects of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 733 (1986).
136
See Reinhold P. Wolff, Monopolistic Competition in Distribution, 8 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 315 (1941).
137
See Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58
YALE L.J. 1121, 1132-1133 (1949). However, one court did find that
A & P’s practice of vertically integrating with suppliers in order to avoid the
RPA was a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. See United
States v. New York Great A & P Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff’d,
173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
138
See Frederick M. Rose, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A
Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COL. L. REV. 1059, 1061-1062 (1957) (noting
rapid growth of chains following World War II).
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regard to market power. In fact, Brandeis and Douglas are the two
Justices who favored using the antitrust laws to pursue size for its own
sake – but always in dissents. In his dissent in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co.,139 Justice Douglas protested against the Supreme
Court’s refusal to condemn a merger of steel producers because of
deficiencies in the government’s market definition.140 Sidestepping
the market definition issue, Justice Douglas concluded that “What we
have here is the problem of bigness.”141 However, he then analyzed
the problem entirely in terms of the power of large firms to control
market prices.142 In the process he acknowledged that control over
prices is not a function of pure size but rather of a firm’s abilities to
control the market.143
Concerns about bigness as such have sometimes made it into
the legislative history of United States antitrust statutes. In his analysis
of the 1950 amendments to the merger provision, Derek C. Bok
observed that much of the debate over the revision of §7 pertained to
non-economic values. He observed that a:
curious aspect of the debates is the paucity of remarks having
to do with the effects of concentration on prices, innovation,
distribution, and efficiency. To be sure, there were allusions to
the need for preserving competition. But competition appeared
to possess a strong socio-political connotation which centered
on the virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom
duplicated in economic literature.144

139

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535 (1948) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
140
See id. at 509-10, 527-28.
141
Id. at 535 (citing BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 92).
142
Id. at 536.
143
Id. He later acknowledged that the merger led to control of about 3% of
the market. Id. at 538.
144
See Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 236-37 (1960); see also Bok, supra,
at 324 (discussing Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
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However, Bok also noted the House Report on the Bill, stating that it
was intended to authorize intervention against mergers whose effect
“may be a significant reduction in the vigor of competition,” although
the effect “may not be so far-reaching as to amount to a combination
in restraint of trade, create a monopoly, or constitute an attempt to
monopolize.”145 It elaborated:
Such an effect may arise in various ways: such as elimination
in whole or in material part of the competitive activity of an
enterprise which has been a substantial factor in competition,
increase in the relative size of the enterprise making the
acquisition to such a point that its advantage over its
competitors threatens to be decisive, undue reduction in the
number of competing enterprises, or establishment of
relationships between buyers and sellers which deprive their
rivals of a fair opportunity to compete.146
Bok concluded that there was little consensus about the extent
to which the statute should incorporate values unrelated to economic
competition, or whether it should incorporate such values at all. Most
of the statements he quoted were complaints about the fact that
concentration had become too high, not about size as such.147
Size or Concentration?
Notwithstanding the views of Justices Brandeis and Douglas,
market concentration and market power, not size, have almost always
been the principal target of antitrust, even during the mid-twentieth
century heyday of antitrust aggressiveness. To be sure, the interest
group politics promulgated by trade associations also advocated
against size as such, and the Robinson-Patman Act was passed without
a market power requirement. Beyond that the Court has never equated
(1960), which condemned acquisition of a firm known to be a cutter). Bok
would later become Harvard’s President.
145
Id. at 237 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949)).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 228-238.
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mere size with competitive harm. Even the Progressives (Brandeis and
Douglas aside) were focused on market dominance and concentration
rather than size. The tools for measuring concentration had been
developed by Progressive economists at the beginning of the twentieth
century, and generally relied on census data to determine the number
of firms in a market and their shares. That approach has always been
fraught with problems, but it continues to be used.148
United States antitrust policy has never condemned a merger
without regard to market share or the ability to exercise market
power,149 although the market share numbers that triggered a challenge
were once very small in comparison to the numbers we use today.150
The Brown Shoe decision actually went further than any serious
reading of either the amended statute or its legislative history would
authorize. Its condemnation of the merger followed only after a
lengthy analysis of the relevant market151 and its assumptions about
concentration.152 Nevertheless, it also approved the district court’s
conclusion that the merger was harmful because it enabled Brown
Shoe to sell shoes at a lower price than its rivals, or to offer higher
quality at the same price.153 That, of course, would be a threat posed
148

On the Progressive development, see Hovenkamp, supra note 12.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a, does define its requirements
for pre-merger notification of larger acquisitions in terms of large dollar size
rather than market share, but these requirements are driven by concerns for
administrative convenience and have nothing to do with the liability
standard. As the Merger Guidelines make clear, the measurement of market
power or market concentration remains dispositive. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice
& Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) [hereinafter
Horizontal Merger Guidelines], https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontalmerger-guidelines-08192010.
150
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United
States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
151
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320-325.
152
Id. at 315, 316-17 (“rising tide of economic concentration”); see also id.
at 331-333 (“trend toward concentration”).
153
Brown Shoe, 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S. 294
(1962) (condemning the merger because it gave the post-merger firm
decisive advantages, resulting in “lower prices or in higher quality for the
149
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by bigness without regard to market share. Depending on the extent of
scale economies or the cost savings made available by vertical
integration, even a larger firm with a small market share could
undersell smaller rivals. Further, the natural consequence of lower
costs and prices would be firm growth at the expense of higher cost
firms.
Brown Shoe and Columbia Steel together illustrate something
important about the relationship between absolute size and control
over prices. If large size leads to lower prices reflecting economies of
scale or vertical integration, as Brown Shoe conceded, then a large firm
can have a significant influence even though its market share is
relatively small. That was also true of the chain stores, which drove
smaller firms out of business by the thousands, even though the chain
stores themselves had not achieved dominant market positions.154 By
contrast, if the fear is of high prices, then mere large size cannot be the
culprit; the firm must also occupy enough of the market to have an
impact on market wide output.
The requirement of high share of a relevant market is driven
entirely by the fact that the feared evil is high prices, not low ones.
This difference strikes to the heart of antitrust policy. If the goal is to
protect higher cost firms from a bigger firm’s lower prices, then market
share may not matter; simple bigness is the problem. However, if the
goal is to protect consumers and labor from market dominance and the
resulting higher prices, then actual dominance of the market must be
either present or realistically threatened.
Justice Douglas acknowledged as much in his dissent in
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States155 a year after
Columbia Steel. In an odd flip from his strongly pro-interventionist
antitrust views, he dissented from the Supreme Court’s condemnation
same price,” with the effect that “the independent retailer can no longer
compete”).
154
See discussion supra text at notes __.
155
337 U.S. 292 (1949).
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of Standard Oil’s exclusive dealing agreements with retail gasoline
stations.156 Standard's exclusive dealing contracts, which prohibited
Standard branded gasoline stations from offering multiple brands of
gasoline, covered 16% of the gasoline retailers in the area.157 If such
contracts threatened higher prices it is hard to see how a coverage of
16% could be sufficient; customers could find ample alternatives. But
that was not the basis of Justice Douglas’ dissent. He was concerned
that the majority’s disapproval of exclusive dealing contracts would
force the oil companies to “build service-station empires of their
own.”158 To the extent that single-branding enabled them to operate
more efficiently, they would simply build their own gasoline stations.
Single branding decisions could become unilateral conduct
unreachable by the antitrust laws.
Concerns about bigness as such are not based on any coherent
theory relating size to prices, unless we really do want to follow
Justices Brandeis and Douglas down the rabbit hole that antitrust
should be concerned about protecting smaller firms or those dedicated
to older technologies. That leaves noneconomic concerns. For
example, the fear may be that large firms have more undesirable
political power.

Bigness and Political Power: Trade Associations

Business unquestionably wields considerable political
power.
Over the history of antitrust and even including Brandeis’
era, however, far more damaging consequences resulted from the
activities of trade associations than of large individual firms. In fact,
trade association involvement in the Brandeisian disputes over the
159

156

Id. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 295.
158
Id. at 320.
157

159

For an excellent study covering this period, see JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR.,
POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION, supra note 55.
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chain stores and the licensing of ice production was only a tiny tip of
the iceberg. Legal historian Lawrence Friedman once observed that
the vast majority of occupational licensing restrictions in the United
States did not originate with governments but rather with trade
associations protecting their turf.160 To be sure, they also had
legitimate public-regarding interests in protecting the quality and
integrity of their business. The activities of trade and professional
associations reflect a mixture of these two interests,161 and antitrust
law has been used often to police that balance.
That exposes another problem with bigness tests: market
dominating trade associations are much more likely to harm
competition than are large individual firms, and they have a more
successful history of doing so. Trade associations can profit
significantly from collusion. On the other side, they are less likely to
yield the kind of integration and coordination that make larger firms
more efficient. One thing that they are good at is lobbying. These
conclusions are no different than the explanation of why we apply
more aggressive antitrust rules to cartels than we do to single firm
conduct.
A significant portion of antitrust law’s “state action” doctrine
is concerned with the anticompetitive activities of trade and
160

Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing
1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 43 CAL. L. REV. 487, 503 (1965)
(describing regulation as “actively sought by the regulated”). See also Aaron
Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny, 162 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 1093 (2014)
(noting extent to which licensing boards are dominated by active
participants). Accord Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse:
Occupational Licensing Boards up Close, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1567 (2017).
On the extent of legislative capture by the industry, see Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Public Choice Theory & Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 209 (2016).
161
See GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF
REGULATED COMPETITION, 1900-1932 (2009); Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim,
Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence
of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723 (2005).
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professional associations who have lobbied governments and obtained
anticompetitive restrictions.162 The number of such decisions exceeds
the antitrust challenges to unilateral conduct by a wide margin.
While Brandeis repeatedly expressed concerns about the power
of very large firms, he was a lifelong supporter of “fair trade” and
similar associations. These were often little more than fronts for dealer
cartels intended to keep lower cost rivals out of the market. That was
true of the Dr. Miles antitrust case that initially condemned resale price
maintenance. The Court was breaking up a cartel that used RPM as an
enforcement mechanism against a discounter.163 Too much of the
history of trade associations shows their members banding together to
support resale price maintenance or to oppose chain stores, new market
entry by more aggressive sellers, or in some cases even market shifting
innovations.164
In a large study of “open price” trade associations in 1925,165
the FTC observed that many of the complaints against them involved
162

See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct.
1101 (2015) (striking down dental association rule preventing non dentists
from whitening teeth); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (striking down rule requiring vintners to
impose resale price maintenance on retailers); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking down bar association rule fixing legal fees).
See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 221-228 (5th ed. 2020) (discussing numerous decisions).
163
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
On the cartel of small druggists behind the scheme, see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 340-347
(1991).
164
See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics
of Crony Capitalism, 101 IOWA L. REV. 573 (2016) (on auto dealer
organizations’ use of state law to resist Tesla’s innovations in retail car sales).
165
See Open-Price Trade Associations Report, supra note 83. So-called
Open Price trade associations involved agreements among groups of
competitors to make prices and terms public and often to limit discounting,
but to avoid explicitly fixing prices. They were heavily studied in the 1910s
and 1920s. See, e.g., H.R. Tosdal, Open Price Associations, 7 AM. ECON.
REV. 331 (1917). The principal treatise, which largely defended them, was
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resale price maintenance,166 much of which was facilitated by trade
associations.167 In addition, trade associations promulgated numerous
ethical codes that were little more than disguised attempts either to
facilitate price fixing or else to prevent firms from integrating into new
areas.168 In its 1919 decision in Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v.
United States,169 the Supreme Court applied the Sherman Act to
condemn a small lumber retailer association’s rule that forbad dealing
with lumber suppliers who had integrated into retailing.
In 1955 Edward F. Howrey, Chairman of the FTC, lamented
that a significant part of his agency’s workload consisted of
investigating price fixing, price information exchanges and related
practices by trade associations intended to limit price competition

ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION (1912). See Gerald Berk,
Communities and Competitors: Open Price Associations and the America
State, 1911-1929, 30 SOC. SCI. HIST. 375 (1996).
166
Id. at 253.
167
The FTC Report on Trade Associations contained a lengthy description of
the various codes of ethics promulgated by many trade associations. See,
e.g., id. at 275-280 (discussing such attempts by the National Association of
Gummed Tape Manufacturers and the National Paper Trade Association); id.
at 81-82 (tracing how the Sugar Institute, similarly, was ultimately
condemned by Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936));
id. at 256 (describing how various associations, including the Western
Confectioners Association, promulgated ethical codes discouraging
discounts or rebates); id. at 284 (describing how the code made it unethical
to invade the territory of a competitor); id. at 288 (describing how the code
made it unethical for a member of Wisconsin Canners’ Association to sell
directly to A & P rather than to independent canners); id. at 304 (describing
how, for funeral directors, code made it unethical to advertise prices).
168
See Open-Price Trade Associations Report, supra note 83, at 47
(describing how the Associated Office Furniture Manufacturers required
publication of a price list and adherence to it).
169
234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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among members.170 That trend has continued. As many as one-third
of cartel cases arise out of trade association activities.171
Conclusion
Should antitrust policy be concerned with single-firm bigness
itself, without regard to market dominance? To be sure, some very
large firms dominate their markets, and antitrust’s stated concern with
monopoly includes those. But markets consist of products, not firms,
and many large firms are not dominant players in the products that they
sell. Nevertheless, the idea that antitrust is really about bigness has
always had a place in populist rhetoric, and has preoccupied a
significant portion of the generalist press. Ultimately the arguments
about using the antitrust laws to target size for its own sake reduce to
some form of protection for small business, preferences about pricing
that favor smaller and higher cost firms, or concerns that new
technology may disfavor smaller established firms.
The concerns about large absolute size do show up in the
hostility directed against large internet platforms. As a general
proposition the concern is rarely high prices and only occasionally
monopoly. Overall, the large platforms sell their services and goods
either at a very low price or else at a price of zero, although some third
parties such as advertisers may pay high prices. Consumer satisfaction
with these firms is generally high.172

170

Edward F. Howrey, The Federal Trade Commission Looks at Trade
Associations, 6 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 20 (1955). For a good summary
of antitrust activity against trade association cartels in the 1920s, see Robert
T. Joseph, John Lord O’Brian Hoover’s Antitrust Chief, Gives the FTC an
Antitrust Lesson, 25 ANTITRUST 88 (2010), and see Barak Orbach, The
Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439 (2019).
171
Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in
Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1687-88 (2008) (citing
numerous studies).
172
See https://www.statista.com/statistics/185966/us-customer-satisfactionwith-google/ (Google); https://www.marketingcharts.com/industries/retailand-e-commerce-118573 (brand loyalty, Amazon #1, Apple #2);
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Considering today’s large digital platforms, they are not
monopolies in most of the markets in which they operate. There are
some exceptions. Google Search has a dominant share (exceeding
90%) of the consumer search market. Amazon very likely has a
monopoly position (about 81%) in ebooks, assuming that ebooks are a
distinct market from print books. But neither Facebook nor Amazon
has anything close to monopoly power in the vast number of individual
products and services that they sell. Currently pending legislation such
as the self-preferencing bill may change that because it defines covered
platforms in terms of gross size and may not have an effective market
power requirement.173

The “Competitive Process”
While consumer welfare may be the most commonly stated
goal of the antitrust laws, “protection of the competitive process” is
very likely a close second.174 Claims that antitrust should seek to
https://www.phonearena.com/news/apple-tops-customer-satisfactionsurvey-samsung-drops-two-places_id135181 (Apple, #1, computers).
173
See James Langenfeld, Christopher Ring & Lucia Castiblanco, American
Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2022): Insights from Economics
Regarding Self-Preferencing and Non-Discrimination, AM. BAR ASS’N
ANTITRUST NEWSLETTER (Mar. 23, 2022) (criticizing self-preferencing bill,
among other things, for lack of a market power requirement),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/resources/newsletters/a
merican-innovation-choice-online-act/.
174
See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law and its Critics, 83 ANTITRUST
L.J. 269 (2020) (advocating a “competitive process” goal); S. Scott Hemphill
& Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078-79 (2018)
(identifying competitive process standard with merger enforcement and
arguing that standard applies to both downstream and upstream harms and
appearing to equate it with the welfare of trading partners); Christopher R.
Leslie, The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting
the Standard Setting Process, 98 OR. L. REV. 379 (2020) [hereinafter DOJ’s
Defense] (applying competitive process standard to anticompetitive standard
setting); Jonathan M. Jacobson, Another Take on the Relevant Welfare
Standard for Antitrust, 14 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Aug. 2015) (favoring a
competitive process standard and equating it with increased output); Gregory
J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (2014)
(favoring a competitive process standard and rejecting attempts to state a
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promote the competitive process are certainly less objectionable than
alternatives that represent the views of particular interest groups, such
as attacks on bigness as such.
The idea of a “competitive process” rationale provides us with
little, however, unless the term “competitive process” itself has some
definition. The term may imply an important value that liberal
democracy places on process. Within that framework it may stand for
a kind of minimalism that requires antitrust policy to umpire the
competitive game but little more, much as a dedication to “free
markets” operates as a highly generalized principle of economic
freedom to trade.175 Consistent with that, it may refer to situations in
which private actors set up rule making institutions such as standard
setting organizations. Antitrust law then queries whether decision
making in these organizations is consistent with a competitive process
but is loathe to review the susbsantive decisions themselves.176 The
assumption in such cases must be that the market works well enough
when left to itself, provided that people play by the rules.
For example, in Rambus, Inc. v. FTC,177 the D.C. Circuit found
that the defendant’s violations of rather poorly articulated standard
setting rules were not acts of monopolization under a stated
“competitive process” test.178 There was no exclusion, as §2 of the
Sherman Act requires. More dubiously, in FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc.,179
the Ninth Circuit found that violations of an obligation to engage in
welfare standard); Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning
Immunity, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1992) (embracing competitive process goal
and applying it to political petitioning).
175
Cf. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 4 (2022)
(noting liberal democracy’s emphasis on process).
176
See Leslie, DOJ’s Defense, supra note 174 (appearing to use “competitive
process” this way). See also Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (where
stock brokerage was heavily governed by private rules, plaintiff was entitled
to procedures similar to those in public adjudication of rights).
177
522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
178

Id. at 463-466.

179

969 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2020).
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FRAND licensing180 did not violate the antitrust laws under a
competitive process formulation, even though there was exclusion and
higher prices. In that case, “protection of the competitive process” did
not even obligate a firm to follow its own agreed-upon rules, and even
in the presence of competitive harm. That makes “competitive
process” rationales a toothless instrument for pursuing anticompetitive
conduct.
Most antitrust litigation does not arise in markets governed by
private institutional rules such as those involved in standard setting. In
that case, what are the rules? Within our Constitutional public law
system, the process rationale for property and liberty rights falls back
on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, with their protections of
established property rights, notice, opportunity to be heard, reasoned
decision making, and Equal Protection. The staunchest laissez faire
liberal is almost always a strong believer in the institutions of contract
and property law, as well as procedural due process.181
If conduct is not covered by a valid contract or unlawful on
some other ground, we are largely at an impasse. As an antitrust goal,
protection of the competitive process suffers from one substantial
weakness: It does not say anything. The “competitive process” can
mean pretty much what anyone thinks it means.182 As a result it
embraces mutually inconsistent antitrust ideologies.

180

FRAND is a system for cross-licensing patents that operate on a common
technology on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” terms. See
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORN. L. REV.
1683 (2020).
181
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION:
THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2017).
182
Cf. John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94
IND. L.J. 501, 514 (2019) (arguing the content of the competitive process
standard “remains mercurial, a cipher” and noting we “never seem to identify
what, exactly, constitutes the ‘competitive process’”); Maurice E. Stucke,
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 BOS. COLL. L. REV. 551 (2012)
(disputing all economic statements of antitrust goals, including competitive
process and consumer welfare).
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Consider the simple example of tying arrangements, or a
seller’s requirement that a buyer purchase two things together. A
hospital might refuse to provide surgical services unless the patient
uses the hospital’s own anesthesiologist.183 Assuming that this policy
is not legally defective on other grounds, what does a “competitive
process” rationale say about it in an antitrust challenge? The policy
excludes rival anesthesiologists, but nearly every agreement excludes
the resources covered by that particular agreement. What else are they
excluded from, and with what effect? Under the now largely
repudiated leverage theory the tie may be thought to generate higher
prices, but the free market enables firms to set any price they wish.184
The tie may enable the hospital to price discriminate, but many sales
policies subject to free market competition do that.185 We might begin
with a strong short run purchaser welfare premise that in a free market
every buyer should have the right to purchase things in whatever
package she desires, but that policy would lead to such things as people
insisting on shirts without their buttons, bananas without their peels,
or automobiles without their tires.186 We might attach a market power
requirement, on the assumption that a competitive firm could not get
away with imposing a tie unless it is harmless.187 But such a
requirement serves only to make harm plausible, not necessary. Even
a monopoly clothier should probably be able to insist that people
purchase shirts with their buttons.
In sum, an antitrust concern articulated as protection of the
competitive process does not give us much help unless we have some
substance to tell us what is intelligent policy and what is not. In tying
law economics has provided most of that substance, with its concerns
about exercises of market power, production or transaction cost
savings, price discrimination, disputes over the existence of harmful
183

As in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
On ties and leverage, see 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1701b, 1710 (4th ed. 2019).
185
Id. ¶ 1711.
186
Id. ch. 17D-1.
187
Id. ch. 17C.
184
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leverage, foreclosure, and the like.188 The term “competitive process”
adds nothing to these.
This toothlessness may explain why protection of the
competitive process has been embraced by both liberals who want to
expand antitrust enforcement and conservatives who want to shrink it.
Justice Breyer cited it to complain that American Express’s policy of
forbidding merchants from encouraging defections from its high fees
harmed the competitive process.189 He also invoked it to approve
NYNEX’s exclusive arrangement for purchasing equipment removal
services when the harm occurred only to a single competitor.190 Justice
Stevens used the term in a dissent to conclude that the competitive
process required protection of the independence of individual traders,
and this required continuation of a rule forbidding maximum resale
price maintenance.191 By contrast, in his dissent in Albrecht v. Herald
Co., which had initially established the per se illegality of maximum
resale price maintenance, Justice Harlan concluded the opposite. He
believed that the competitive process required supplier freedom to
enforce maximum resale prices.192 As far as consumer harm is
concerned, Justice Harlan had the better of this argument – striking
down maximum resale price maintenance agreements under a per se
rule almost invariably benefits individual dealers with market power
at the expense of consumers.193

188

For a catalog of these harms, see 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1703-11 (4th ed. 2018).
189
See Ohio v. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2294 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
190
See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).
191
See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 359
(1990) (Stevens., J., dissenting).
192
Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145, 170 n.4 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
193
See Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule after Khan:
Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123 (1998).
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Some lower court decisions have equated the competitive
process with high output or low prices.194 When Justice Breyer was
on the First Circuit he identified harm to the “competitive process” as
conduct that “obstructs the achievement of competition’s basic goals
– lower prices, better products, and more efficient production
methods.”195 Those are admirable goals, but a focus on consumer
welfare and output gets to them much more directly.196 A ninth Circuit
decision indicated that antitrust concerns for the “competitive process”
foreclosed the condemnation of “economic behavior that benefits
consumers.”197 These formulations effectively equate the competitive
process with some formulations of a consumer welfare test. Others,
including Microsoft,198 use the term to distinguish conduct that harms
competitors from conduct that harms consumers.199 Still others use it
to explain that conduct that harms the “competitive process” is
different from conduct that merely harms competitors.200 In its
194

See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 536, 566 (7th Cir.
1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding protection of competitive process should “discourage
practices that make it hard for consumers to buy at competitive prices”).
195
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990).
196
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
197
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903 (9th Cir.
2008).
198
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t
must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast,
harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”); accord Camp-All Corp.
v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1988).
199
St. Luke’s Hosp. v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 8 F.4th 479, 486 (6th Cir.
2021) (“The focus is on guarding the competitive process and on protecting
the welfare of consumers, not on ensuring the economic fortunes of
competitors.”); Cohlmia v. St. John Med. Ctr., 693 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th
Cir. 2012) (describing the primary concern of antitrust law as “corruption of
the competitive process, not the success or failure of a particular firm”);
Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 453 (7th Cir. 2020)
(describing need for the conduct to harm the competitive process).
200
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“Conduct that merely harms competitors, however, while not harming the
competitive process itself, is not anticompetititive.”); Euromodas, Inc. v.
Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2004) (similar).
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decision in FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., the Ninth Circuit used it in this
way to exonerate exclusive selling practices even though it also
acknowledged that the defendant’s activities resulted in higher
prices.201 That outcome seems to be inconsistent with either a
defensible competitive process test or a consumer welfare test.
In May 2022, the head of the Antitrust Division attempted to
rescue a competitive process standard.202 After pointing out the many
deficiencies in consumer welfare standards, he stated a preference for
a wide-ranging competitive process standard that invoked such
statements as that the Sherman Act is a “comprehensive charter of
economic liberty,” promoting structures that are good for our
democracy and our society.”203 Mr. Kanter also illustrated some
possibilities. The standard would require “treating employees with
respect” because they have the right to leave. That might suggest a
stronger policy about enforcement of noncompete agreements. To the
extent it simply requires employers to behave more respectfully toward
employees, however, it seems untethered from antitrust policy. Mr.
Kanter also suggested that under this approach consumers, farmers,
and everyone else “should have the free opportunity to select among
969 F.3d 974, 989 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Allegations that conduct ‘has the
effect of reducing consumers’ choices or increasing prices to consumers do[]
not sufficiently allege an injury to competition . . . [because] [b]oth effects
are fully consistent with a free, competitive market.’” (quoting Brantley v.
NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012)).
202
Jonathan Kanter, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Milton Handler Lecture
(May 18, 2022), Col. Bus. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Kanter’s
Handler Lecture], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-jonathan-kanter-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-bar-association.
For good commentary, see Einer Elhauge, Should the Competitive Process
Test Replace the Consumer Welfare Standard?, PROMARKET (May 24,
2022),
https://www.promarket.org/2022/05/24/should-the-competitiveprocess-test-replace-the-consumer-welfare-standard/.
203
Kanter’s Handler Lecture, supra note 202 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (applying per se rule to condemning tying
agreement in which railroads sold land subject to “preferential routing”
clauses under which owners must use the railroad for shipping unless another
carrier gave better rates)).
201
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alternative offers.” That might indicate greater intervention against
vertical restraints, although the Supreme Court decision that Kanter
quoted for that proposition actually condemned a horizontal agreement
that limited competitive bidding.204
How much of this will be articulated in Antitrust Division
enforcement policy is unclear. The devil, of course, is in the details
and this speech was not explicit about how it would apply antitrust law
in situations in which alternative non-economic interests should be
considered.
In sum, “protection of the competitive process” is a slogan, not
a goal. As an abstract proposition it may claim broad assent, but there
is little room for optimism that it can ever be a useful device for making
real decisions. Antitrust lawyers can assert protection of the
competitive process as a goal, just as economists can proclaim a
commitment to “free markets” or lawyers may urge people to “do
justice.” But none of these does much to focus the range of disputes.

Antitrust “Welfare” Tests
Welfare tests promise something that neither concerns about
size nor about the competitive process can deliver -- namely, a
measurable goal associated with the health of the economy and the
well being of its citizens. The meaning of “consumer welfare” has
unfortunately became corrupted and controversial and it has always
been beset by problems of measurement. At the atmospheric level it
Id. (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978)). The published speech also cited two additional horizontal decisions
with parentheticals. See id. n.21 (citing FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986), for the proposition that “Limiting consumer choice
by impeding the ‘ordinary give and take of the market place’ cannot be
sustained under the Rule of Reason.” (internal citation omitted) and citing
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107, for the
proposition that “A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of
consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this
fundamental goal of antitrust law.”).
204
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is hard to disagree with the proposition that the antitrust laws should
have something to do with the welfare of consumers. Indeed,
“Protecting America’s Consumers” is part of the FTC’s masthead.205
That serves to explain its value as a slogan. But can it be more than
that?
This subsection considers the two versions of the consumer
welfare test that dominate antitrust policy debate today, as well as an
approach to consumer welfare that is more focused on the things that
courts can and do actually measure – namely, output or price.
Two definitions of consumer welfare have dominated the
antitrust debate, although people have not always appreciated the
difference. One is a actually a misnomer that Robert Bork adopted
from Nobel prize economist Oliver Williamson and should more
accurately be called a “welfare tradeoff” model. That was the name
that Williamson himself gave it.206 Under that model antitrust policy
addresses practices that can have both monopoly-creating and costreducing effects. A practice should be unlawful if the monopoly loss
exceeds the cost savings.207
The alternative definition is that antitrust should seek to
maximize the net welfare of consumers. We refer to this as “true
consumer welfare”208 to distinguish it from the welfare-tradeoff
definition, or the definition most generally used in welfare economics,
which contemplates trading off gains and losses. If offsetting
efficiencies to an increase in market power are to be considered, it is
only when the cost savings that they generate are so significant that
consumers are left unharmed. A variation of this version is

205

See FTC.gov.

206

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
207
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
208
This term comes from Steven C. Salop, What Is the Real and Proper
Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard,
22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 338-48 (2010).
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incorporated into the current editions of the Merger Guidelines.209
Whether it stays there in the next round of revisions is unclear, given
that both the head of the Antitrust Division and the Chair of the FTC
have challenged the consumer welfare standard generally, although
not necessarily the specific application in the Merger Guidelines.210
Of course, given the malleability of a competitive process standard, a
merger rule that requires consumers to be held harmless could also be
consistent with that standard.
One thing that both versions of the consumer welfare principle
seek to avoid is bringing in concerns that, while certainly important,
are not related to consumer welfare. In his May, 2022, Handler lecture
Assistant Attorney General Kanter spoke rather generally about using
antitrust law to promote freedom. He also faulted the consumer
welfare standard for the idea that “antitrust cases should be reduced to
econometric quantification of the price or output effects” of challenged
conduct.211 In addition he criticized the consumer welfare test for
being blind to “workers, farmers, and the many other intended benefits
and beneficiaries of a competitive economy.” The latter is a valid
criticism of the Bork welfare-tradeoff model of consumer welfare,
which ignored the situation of workers in particular.212 It is not an
appropriate criticism of true consumer welfare properly defined as the
welfare of consumers and those who benefits from increased output.

209

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149, § 10 (accepting an
efficiencies defense to a merger only if the efficiencies are sufficient so as to
prevent price increases). More generally, see id. § 1 (“The unifying theme
of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create,
enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise . . . . A merger
enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise
price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a
result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”).
210
See Kanter’s Handler Lecture, supra note 202; Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s
Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017).
211
See Kanter’s Handler Lecture, supra note 202.
212
See Hovenkamp, supra note 31.
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That standard benefits all suppliers, including workers, as well as
purchasers.213
Whether AAG Cantor’s remaining concerns acquire any
traction in antitrust policy remains to be seen. A test case would be
one in which consumers and labor and other input suppliers are not
injured by any of the criteria that we use to identify consumer harm
but the conduct should be prosecuted under the antitrust laws anyway.
That could easily take antitrust into other areas of legal policy best
served by alternative statutory systems.
Economic Welfare, Historically Considered
“Welfare” tests in neoclassical economics date to the early part
of the twentieth century, and usually associate welfare with Pareto
optimality or a little later with models that contemplated tradeoffs
between winners and losers.214 Those tests considered whether
winners from a policy change gained enough to compensate losers
fully for their gains, and are an important foundation for modern costbenefit analysis.215
The more particular term “consumer welfare” had scattered
uses prior to the 1960s, often in association with practices such as
commercial fraud and false advertising,216 or sometimes with “home

213

Id.
See ROGER A. MCCAIN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY (2019). For a thumbnail history, see Welfare Economics, 4 NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. 889-95 (1987); Antoinette Baujard,
Welfare Economics (GATE Working Paper No. 1333, 2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2357412.
215
See, e.g., John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON.
J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). On costbenefit analysis, see Robin W. Broadway, The Welfare Foundations of CostBenefit Analysis, 84 ECON. J. 926 (1974).
214

216

This was particularly true in reference to the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C.
§52, et seq., which extended the coverage of the FTC Act to unfair or deceptive acts
or practices. See, e.g., Saul Nelson, Representation of the Consumer Interest in the
Federal Government, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 151 (1939); Milton Handler, The
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economics,” which was the economics of managing a household.217 In
the United States, Progressives and a little later Institutionalist
economists called for increased attention to consumers in economic
theory.218 In the 1950s John Kenneth Galbraith, the most influential
public economist of his time, used the term in reference to lower
consumer prices.219 He addressed the antitrust laws mainly to deal
with the argument that the existence of countervailing buyer power
would make the antitrust laws unnecessary, because imbalances would
be righted in the market.220 While Galbraith rejected that conclusion,
he did suggest that the concept of countervailing power spoke in favor
of antitrust exemptions for labor unions and agricultural combinations
– two interest groups that bargained across the table from large
manufacturers.221
A more explicit focus on the relationship between consumer
welfare and antitrust policy emerged in the work of Oliver Williamson
in the 1960s. He hypothesized a welfare tradeoff that occurs when a
practice results simultaneously in output-reducing monopoly and
productive efficiency.222 A practice should be deemed a welfare
improvement and thus lawful under the antitrust laws, he reasoned, if
the production cost savings that it generated was greater than the
economic loss occasioned by increased monopoly.

Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 L. & CONTEMP., PROB.
91 (1939).
217

See, e.g., Albert S. Keister, The Consumer Is Stirring, 3 S. ECON. J. 317
(1937) (book review); CONSUMER PROBLEMS IN WARTIME (Kenneth
Dameron ed., 1944).
218
See e.g., Robert S. Lynd, The Consumer Becomes a “Problem,” 173
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1934).
219
See John Kenneth Galbraith, Countervailing Power, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(1954); see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE
CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1956).
220
See GALBRAITH, Countervailing Power, supra note 219, at 5-6.
221
Id. at 6.
222
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
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Williamson did not use the term “consumer welfare” in his
original proposal, although he did speak of loss of consumers’ surplus
from increased monopoly power.223 Aggregate consumers’ surplus,
which is output multiplied by the surplus consumers obtain from each
transaction, should be the same thing as consumer welfare. Surplus in
this context refers to the difference between a consumer’s willingness
to pay and the actual price. For example, if a consumer is willing to
pay $4 for a loaf of bread but is able to buy it for $3, that transactions
yields a $1 surplus.
Williamson’s welfare tradeoff model would condone higher
consumer prices and their attendant output reductions, provided that
the welfare loss occasioned by this monopoly was at least offset by
gains in productive efficiency. That also suggested that price
increasing conduct could increase welfare. Further, he concluded, in
most instances relatively modest efficiency gains would be enough to
offset fairly significant price increases.224
In 1978 Robert Bork borrowed the Williamson model but
renamed it “consumer welfare.” That name has stuck and has become
very influential, particularly in more conservative antitrust circles.
This figure, taken from Bork’s book, illustrates the model:

223

Id. at 22, 27; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust
Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977) (speaking repeatedly of
“consumers’ surplus” but not using the term “consumer welfare”).
224
Williamson, Economies, Id. at 22 (“A relatively modest cost reduction is
usually sufficient to offset relatively large price increases.”).
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Figure 1

Williamson and later Bork hypothesized a situation in which a
market was initially competitive, operating at price P1 and output 01.
P1 equaled AC1, or average cost. The figure, which Willamson
described as “naïve,” did not include marginal costs and did not
distinguish fixed from variable costs.225 At that point a merger, joint
venture, or some other practice simultaneously gave that firm market
power, enabling it to raise prices and producing the traditional
monopoly “deadweight loss” designated by shaded area A1. At the
same time, however, this practice produced productive efficiency
gains that reduced the firm’s average costs from AC1 to AC2,
producing the cost savings, or efficiency gains, designated by shaded
area A2. According to both Williamson and Bork, this practice should
be regarded as welfare reducing, and thus unlawful under the antitrust
laws, only if the deadweight loss area A1 was larger than the cost
saving rectangle designated A2.
A few things about the model are noteworthy. By identifying
the deadweight loss triangle designated A1 as the social cost of
225

Williamson’s article never mentioned fixed, variable, or marginal costs.
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monopoly, Williamson and Bork adopted an estimate at the very
lowest end of the range of estimates. It did not include resources
anticompetitively spent in acquiring monopoly or the value of the
destroyed investments of rivals.226
In addition, Williamson’s model began with an assumption of
prior perfect competition, or at least of prices equal to cost, and then
assumed a practice such as a merger that created the monopoly.
However, if one begins with the far more realistic assumption of a
market that is already fairly noncompetitive to begin with, a much
greater productive efficiency gain would be needed in order to offset
the increased deadweight loss.227
The administrative costs and uncertainties that attach to
applying the welfare-tradeoff model are frightful, at least in close
cases. One would have to quantify the deadweight loss from the
resulting monopoly and then offset that against the dollar amount of
the efficiency gains. Quantifying the loss of consumers’ surplus would
require information about the shape of the demand curve over the
reduced output. For this reason, the welfare-tradeoff test has never
actually been applied in a case brought under United States antitrust
law.228

226

Making this critique are Keith Cowling and Dennis C. Mueller, The Social
Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON. J. 727 (1978), Richard A. Posner, The
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975), and
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78
IOWA L. REV. 371 (1993).
227
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 703, 722 (2017).
228
Canadian antitrust purports to follow a version of it. See, e.g., Comm'r of
Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc., 2003 FCA 53, paras. 57-58 (Can.).
For critiques, see Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Sunny Knott, An Economic
Justification for a Price Standard in Merger Policy: The Merger of Superior
Propane and ICG Propane, in 21 RSCH. L. & ECON: ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
409, 416-18 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004), and Darwin V. Neher, David M.
Russo, & J. Douglas Zona, Lessons from the Superior-ICG Merger, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 289 (2003) (noting the complexities inherent in the total
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The model also strictly measured the tradeoff between
competition and the emergence of single firm monopoly. However,
both Williamson and Bork applied the model to mergers and joint
ventures, where the more realistic threat was of increased market
concentration and collusion-like behavior. But in that case the price
increase and output reduction would be market wide, while the
productive efficiency gains would apply only to the particular firms
that merged. For example, if two firms in a market of five identical
firms should merge and cause a market wide output reduction, the
effect of the increased prices would apply across the entire market, but
only the two merging firms, with an aggregate 40% market share,
would attain the productive efficiencies. In that case the deadweight
loss could be two and a half times larger than the Williamson
estimate.229
Another deficiency of the model was that it simply assumed
perfectly competitive costs that were not affected by the challenged
practice. That is, the firm(s) supply costs were a black box. They
apparently purchased in a perfectly competitive market for inputs,
including labor, both prior to and after the challenged practice. If the
firms had any degree of monopsony power in input markets including

welfare test that the tribunal applied and concluding, “The complexity of the
required economic analysis and its inherent inexactitude imply a relatively
high level of uncertainty in the conclusion. This uncertainty arises because,
among other things: (1) the total surplus standard requires balancing all the
effects; (2) the complexity of measuring each effect means that various
simplifying assumptions must be made to make the problem tractable, and
this implies that the utilized models deviates from reality; (3) ultimately there
is uncertainty in some of the underlying features of the market, for example,
the industry demand elasticity; (4) the complexity of the required analysis to
measure each effect provides an environment for technical errors; and (5) the
need to balance all effects makes the uncertainties compound one another.”)
229
In the case of “unilateral effects” mergers, where only the merging parties
experience the price increase, the outcome would be closer to the one
Williamson envisioned. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149,
§ 6.
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labor, however, then the model understated the deadweight loss,
perhaps significantly.230
Another feature of the Williamson-Bork model was its
completely unrealistic assumptions about efficiency and output. In the
figure reprinted from Bork’s book the challenged practice resulted in
significantly lower per unit costs, even as it reduced output from Q1 to
Q2. The figure suggests an output reduction of roughly one half. In
any real situation the output decrease could be less than or more than
that, depending on the amount of market power that the practice
created, the magnitude of the efficiency gains, and the shape of the
demand curve.
Neither Williamson nor Bork elaborated on the types of
practices that could result simultaneously in cost savings and output
reductions of such magnitudes. Is this simply an example of what
Ronald Coase called “blackboard economics” -- something that can be
drawn with chalk but has little application in the world?231 The most
prominent cost savings that accrues from practices that are
challengeable under the antitrust laws is economies of scale, but these
generally accrue at higher rather than lower output. There is also the
problem of fixed costs. Per unit fixed costs go up as output goes down,
and the AC lines in the figure refer to all costs, both fixed and variable.
Efficiency gains accompanying such a significant output reduction
suggests that fixed costs in this industry must not be very high. But if
that is the case, then what is the source of the monopoly? This is not
necessarily to suggest that the picture describes an empty set, but only
that the circumstances are not very common and must be proven.
Bork himself had a very peculiar idea about the relationship
between efficiency, output and firm size. In describing his consumer
welfare principle, he declared that “any efficiencies associated with a
firm’s size are very likely to outweigh any restriction of output on the
230

See Hovenkamp, supra note 31.
See RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 19, 28
(1989).
231
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consumer welfare scale.”232 In his mind a firm could apparently attain
efficiencies by having a bigger “size” while yet producing less than it
had been before. But what is “size” referring to, if not output?
When we think of a firm’s size for economic or antitrust
purposes, we usually consider output to be the unit of measurement.
A firm that produces 1000 automobiles per time period is larger than
one that produces 900. Could we use revenue as an alternative
measure? For example, a firm that sells $1000 in product is larger than
one that sells $900. In that case the difference might be that the firm
with the larger “size” is earning monopoly profits. As a result its
revenue may be larger even as its unit production is smaller. Another
possibility is capitalization, or market value. For example, a firm with
a larger plant that cost more money is bigger than one with a smaller
plant. One might even imagine that a firm’s “size” is measured by the
number of its employees.
But Bork was speaking about “efficiencies associated with a
firm’s size,” and that could not be revenue. Rather it must be some
kind of productive economy. Perhaps “size” refers to structural
economies of scale without regard to actual production. For example,
a firm might develop a technology that had very low costs and was
able to undersell rivals, but then operate that technology at a very low
rate of output. Looking at the firm’s technology we might compute its
size in relation to the most efficient output level rather than the amount
that the firm is actually producing.
A common characteristic of such cost-reducing technologies is
that the cost savings apply at higher output because that is the way
fixed costs are amortized. That is to say, the larger capital intensive
firm is more efficient, but the efficiencies obtain only at the higher
output rate. Could it produce at a lower rate than it did with the older
technology and still have lower per unit average costs? Perhaps, but

232

ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
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such a result would be sufficiently counterintuitive that it would have
to be proven.
This is not to say that a firm could not build a large low cost
plant and then operate it at inefficiently low levels. The FTC once
even alleged this.233 But the “welfare tradeoff” model clearly does not
contemplate that, because it requires trading actual efficiency gains
against consumer losses. All that one gets by operating a very large
efficient plant at inefficiently low levels is a great deal of wasted
resources, high per unit costs, and higher prices if the firm has market
power. Those hardly sound like a recipe for efficiency gains.
Another factor essential to the welfare-tradeoff model is a strict
requirement that the productive efficiencies that produced the tradeoff
be essential to the particular merger or other event that created the
233

See Dupont de Nemours & Co., 96 FTC 653 (1980) (titanium dioxide).
Also see Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977), which the Dupont case relied on, as well
as Michael Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8
BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977), and Paul Joskow & Alvin Klevorick, A
Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213
(1979). The Commission ultimately dismissed the complaint, reading the
record as fully consistent with the proposition that DuPont, which had the
most efficient known technology, had simply built a very large plant in
contemplation of future expansion, concluding:
When DuPont conceived its strategy in 1972, its estimates of demand
growth and supply shortfall seemed reasonable, and there has been
no suggestion to the contrary. In competing for this growth, DuPont
realized that even expansion of its existing plants to their practical
limits could not satisfy all of the additional demand expected through
the early 1980s. A new plant would be required. To build such a plant
at efficient scale, afforded by DuPont's developed technology, meant
that there would be little, if any, room left for expansion by
competitors. Yet, to deny DuPont the opportunity to compete for all
of the projected demand growth unduly penalizes its technological
success. To require respondent to build a smaller, less efficient plant,
or no plant, under these circumstances would be an unjustified
restraint on competitive incentives and an unjustified denial of the
benefits of competition to consumers.
Dupont de Nemours, 96 FTC at *66.
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monopoly. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflect this
requirement by insisting that a claimed efficiency be “merger
specific.”234 If the gains can be achieved in a way that threatens
competition less, the merger will not be approved.
For example, on underappreciated alternative to mergers,
particularly in tech, is non-exclusive licensing of technology.235
Among the many acquisitions that large digital platforms make of tiny
firms, the principal assets of interest are often intellectual property
rights. The acquisition of a non-exclusive license would give the
acquiring firm everything it needs to improve its own technology, but
the acquired firm’s technology would remain on the market and
available to others.236 When the most important component of an
acquired firm is its intellectual property rights, the merger’s
proponents should be required to show that a non-exclusive intellectual
property license would not provide operational results roughly as good
as those provided by the merger.
True Consumer Welfare and Efficiencies
People have observed that the antitrust statutes never speak of
efficiencies.237 Indeed, they never use that word or any other phrase
that makes the same association, such as cost reduction or quality
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149, § 10 (“The Agencies
credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed
merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These
are termed merger-specific efficiencies.”).
235
The Guidelines mention licensing as an alternative in a footnote but
provide no detail. See id. §10 n.13.
236
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE
L.J. 1952, 2043 (2021). For elaboration, see Kevin A. Bryan & Erik
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, 56 Rev. Indus. Org.
615, 623-29 (2020), and Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup
Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 33942 (2020).
237
See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013, 2026 (2017); Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising
Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 706 (2017).
234
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improvement. Of course, the statutes also fail to mention many other
things that people have come to believe are important to antitrust
analysis, such as industrial concentration, market power, bigness, or
the per se rule.
An answer that is more to the point is that while the statutes do
not mention efficiencies, they do include a requirement of competitive
harm. This requirement is articulated in different ways in different
provisions, such as “restrain trade,” “monopolize,” or ‘substantially
lessen competition.” Further, the importance of efficiencies arises in
two different ways. First, it can refer to “offsets,” in the sense that a
proven efficiency might defend against an actual price increase or
output reduction In that case the absence of efficiency language might
be important. Second, however, efficiencies can refer to cost savings
that are so substantial that no harm ever occurs in the first place. In
that case we do not even need an efficiency defense, for there is no
competitive harm to begin with.
One particular shortcoming of the welfare tradeoff model is
that it is willing to condone true competitive harm in the form of
reduced output and higher prices, provided that those losses are offset
elsewhere by productive efficiency gains.238 An act that the model
ends up justifying can cause actual harm to competitors and labor as a
result of higher prices and lower output. It is justified because it
produces even greater gains to the defendant.239
The true consumer welfare model does not make this error
because it acknowledges only those efficiencies within the second
classification. Efficiencies are relevant, but only if they are substantial
enough to offset completely competitive harm, with the result that
238

See discussion supra, text at notes __.
For a good critique in the context of anticompetitive harm to labor, see
Laura Alexander & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust Worker Protections: Rejecting
Multi-Market Balancing as a Justification for Anticompetitive Harms to
Workers,
90
U.
CHI.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4094046.
239
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there is no harm at all. The most important example of this is merger
policy under the Merger Guidelines, which start out by predicting the
price and output effects of a merger. If that analysis predicts harm
offsetting efficiencies will be allowed, but only if they are sufficient to
reverse the predicted price increase completely.240 That is, there is no
net harm. In that case the absence of efficiency language in the antitrust
statutes is irrelevant. For example, if a merger threatens to raise price
from $8 to $10, it could be defended by evidence that efficiencies
would drive the price back to $8 or less. In that case the merger law’s
“substantially lessen competition” standard has not been met.
The Merger Guidelines approach suggests a template for the
assessing efficiency claims for any restraint whose price or output
effects can be estimated. Efficiencies are and must be relevant.
Ignoring them would be a sure way to ruin the economy. On the other
side, naïve acceptance can serve to exonerate harmful restraints. One
important principle here is that the defendants are the creators of any
efficiencies that they offer. As a result, they are in the best position to
carry the burden of showing that other affected people – consumers
and labor in particular – will be unharmed.241
The assessment problem for restraints other than mergers can
be difficult, however. On the price-increase side mergers of
competitors are relatively simple: just as cartels, they unify pricing and
increase the post-merger firms’ effective market share. Horizontal
contractual restraints may sometimes do this, but they may not. In
some, such as restraints on innovation, measuring price/output effects
could be impossible.242

240

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149, § 10.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 6.1 (6th ed. 2020).
241

242

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247
(2007).
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Measuring “Welfare” in Antitrust Cases
For all of the attention that has been given to consumer welfare
as a guiding principle for antitrust, one thing that has largely escaped
notice is that courts almost never measure “welfare” and are rarely able
to do so. The things that they actually measure are almost always
changes in output or changes in price. They infer welfare effects, if at
all, from these measurements.
Consider figure 2 below. Some version of it is commonly used
in elementary economics and some antitrust classes to illustrate the
effects of monopoly on consumer welfare, which is measured by
consumers’ surplus. The figure shows that when price as set at
marginal cost, which is the competitive level (Pc), consumers’ surplus
(welfare) is equal to triangle 1-3-6. By contrast, when the price is set
at the monopoly level (Pm), consumers surplus has been reduced to
triangle 1-2-4.
Figure 2

Note a few things about this figure. First, as output increases,
consumers’ surplus also increases. Second, as price increases,
consumer surplus goes down. Third, like all triangles the consumers’
surplus triangle has three sides – in this case defined by price, output,
and the demand curve. In the picture the demand curve is a straight
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line, making a true triangle, which means that someone who knew both
the output and the price could easily compute the consumer surplus as
the area of the resulting triangle.243 Because welfare is the same as
consumers’ surplus, measurement is easy.
But most demand curves are not linear. Most common demand
curves are very likely convex to the origin, and if demand is lumpy
they can be irregular. This is true, for example, when purchasers are
arrayed in several distinct but internally homogenous groups. Within
each group demand is fairly constant, but it changes as you move from
one group to the next. As a result, computing actual consumers’
surplus requires detailed information about the shape of the actual
demand curve through the relevant range.
Note also, however, that the first two propositions above
continue to apply even if the demand curve is nonlinear. For any given
demand curve welfare goes up as output goes up, and welfare goes
down as price goes up. Further, antitrust condemns specific practices,
not monopoly as such. As a result, in most cases the best evidence that
we use to estimate competitive consequences are either changes in
market wide output or changes in price. If we can show either that a
particular practice increases market output or decreases price, we can
at least presumptively infer an increase in consumer welfare.
To be sure, the inference might be subject to some exceptions.
Perhaps a decline in nominal output corresponds to a quality
improvement, or a particular practice may increase output but also
increase price. Perhaps a practice such as resale price maintenance
changes the shape or slope of the demand curve in some way. We turn
to those later.244
It is also important not to confuse firm output with market
output. For example, a practice such as a boycott or exclusive vertical
243

With a linear demand curve, consumer surplus would equal half the
product of the output leg and the price leg.
244
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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contract might increase the output of the firms employing that restraint,
but it does so by excluding rivals. If the restraint is anticompetitive,
market wide output will generally go down. Although dealing with
this is not conceptually difficult, it can be a measurement difficulty.
Courts deciding antitrust cases rarely attempt to measure actual
consumer welfare changes, which would require knowledge about the
shape of the demand curve. What they actually measure is changes in
price or changes in output, and they infer conclusions about consumer
welfare from that.245 This is not necessarily a problem, however.
Courts do not need to know the amount of welfare gains or losses that
result from a practice. They need know only whether market output
or price have increased or decreased.
The existence of efficiencies that result from a practice
complicates this analysis. Models for assessing mergers often draw
conclusions about welfare, largely in order to account for efficiency
offsets. But the fundamental question under the Merger Guidelines is
still whether the merger will yield a higher price, not whether it will
increase consumer welfare.246 Indeed, the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, never speak of consumer welfare at all, but only about
price effects.247
Under the Guidelines approach, competitive harm is largely
inferred from the absence of a price increase, with one exception: The
Guidelines contemplate efficiencies defined in terms of “lower prices,
245

See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From
Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 749 (2010);
Matthew C. Weinberg, More Evidence on the Performance of Merger
Simulations, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 51 (2011) (inferring welfare effects from
price changes).; cf. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing
Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969 (2015) (noting problem that
some mergers may increase efficiency by increasing quality rather than by
reducing price). The Merger Guidelines contemplate efficiencies that result
in “lower prices, improved quality, enhanced services, or new products.”
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149, § 10.
246
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149, § 1 (speaking of
mergers that enhance market power, defined as mergers that “raise price,
reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers….”).
247
They also never speak of the “competitive process.”
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improved quality, enhanced services, or new products.”248 As a result,
a merger that yields a higher quality product might qualify even though
the nominal price of the product goes up. By contrast, under a total
welfare standard – which the Guidelines reject – one can have mergers
that increase both welfare and the price of an unchanged product.249
Efficiencies, at least in the simple case, equal the amount of
cost savings on each unit of production multiplied by the number of
units.250 Measurement of efficiencies is more complex if the
efficiencies occur with respect to fixed as well as variable cost.251
Nevertheless, the principle is the same: in order to quantify historical
cost savings over a defined period, one needs to know the size of the
per unit cost reduction and the number of units produced.
Welfare and Damages
If a private plaintiff is seeking damages, these have to be
measured, and that might suggest that welfare losses have to be
computed. In fact, none of our methodologies for assessing antitrust
damages requires a calculation of welfare losses.
First of all, the antitrust damages provision does not require it.
The measure given in §4 of the Clayton Act, “threefold the damages

248

See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 149, § 10.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in
Competition Law, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW (Daniel Zimmer ed.,
2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873432; Roger
D. Blair & Jessica S. Haynes, The Efficiencies Defense in the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57 (2011).
250
See the rectangle “cost savings” in Figure 1, supra. See generally HAROLD
O. FRIED, C.A. KNOX LOVELL & SHELTON S. SCHMIDT, THE MEASUREMENT
OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS (1993).
Specifically for mergers, see Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market
Definition (2010) (speaking mainly of “marginal cost” efficiencies),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1313782.
251
One problem is that an efficiency that reduces only a fixed cost will not
immediately be reflected in a lower market price. By contrast, a variable cost
efficiency typically is.
249
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by him sustained,”252 describes a purely private loss to the plaintiff,
not a social loss, and certainly not a net social loss. The plaintiff’s
individual loss might be an element in the welfare loss, but no more
than that.
In consumer cases damages are measured by the price increase
(“overcharge”) paid by actual purchasers.253 Under an “umbrella”
theory some courts permit damages based on purchases from nonparticipants in cartels who were able to raise their prices.254 No
downstream party has a cause of action for the traditional deadweight
loss, which consist of purchases that were not made at all. In sum
overcharge damages measurements reflect the wealth transfer that
results from a cartel or other practice, but do not pick up the welfare
loss.
The same thing is true of damages for exclusionary practices.
Such plaintiffs are typically either actual or incipient competitors, and
the measure of their damages is the value of lost investment,
sometimes including anticipated lost profits.255 These losses may very
roughly track to losses of market wide output that accompanies an
antitrust violation. For example, in an attempt to get market output
down a cartel might boycott a maverick rival, and the loss in market
wide output might provide the basis for measuring the excluded rival’s
lost sales. But that would be a measure of lost output, not of welfare.
Welfare and Output
Introduction

As noted above, while antitrust tests of legality are often
phrased in terms of “welfare,” in fact the evidence that courts rely on
is almost always based on either output effects or price effects. A
useful and practical way of stating a test is that antitrust law should
252

15 U.S.C. §15 (2018).

253

See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR, &
CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 395-96 (5th ed. 2021).
254
Id. ¶ 348.
255
Id. ¶ 397.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121866

2022

Antitrust Slogans Goals

71

condemn conduct when it is covered by an antitrust statute and has the
effect of reducing market wide output. Price increases will work too,
provided that they result from market wide output reductions. One
qualification is that low prices are the goal on the output side of the
market. One the input side, where the concern is output suppression,
the goal is actually higher prices. For example, restraints in labor
markets tend to reduce wages anticompetitively. By contrast, welfare
on both the output and input sides of the market is lessened by an
output reduction.
While an output definition of competitive harm does not
expressly invoke a consumer welfare principle, it benefits all of those
whose welfare is associated with that of consumers. Consumers and
input suppliers, including labor, are better off as market output
increases. As a result, output or price driven approaches largely
duplicate the result of a true consumer welfare test, but they are more
precise about what is being measured.
Considering effects in labor markets is critical because, first of
all, labor is mainly a variable cost and demand for it is very sensitive
to output.256 Second, when it comes to output responses consumers
are in the driver’s seat: when output increases or decreases consumers
decide their purchasing behavior. Labor largely follows along.
This output-focused formulation has several conceptual and
practical advantages over the various articulations of the “consumer
welfare” principle for antitrust law. First, it addresses the fact that
labor, which benefits from greater job opportunities and more
competitive wages, stands in a position analogous to that of
consumers. Workers almost always benefit from higher production.257
Second, as an operational standard, output is easier to measure than
welfare and almost always produces the correct result. So the welfare
goal of the antitrust laws is best stated as encouraging markets to

256
257

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 31.
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produce the highest sustainable output. The word “sustainable”
distinguishes a few situations such as predatory pricing, in which
output can be anticompetitive because it is too high. This results from
the fact that legally accepted definitions of predatory pricing require
proof of prices below cost, which are not sustainable in the long run.258
The disadvantages of an output-based standard are, first, that
output can be difficult to measure, although it is never as hard to
measure as welfare is. Second, there may be cases when output and
economic welfare do not pull in the same direction – that is, where
higher output actually results in lower welfare, or vice-versa. The
value of an output standard depends on how frequently these situations
occur, how often they yield unacceptable results, and whether they can
be identified and controlled.259 In the discussion below we suggest
that they are either sufficiently minor that they can be ignored or else
clearly detectable. In decades of antitrust litigation under the rule of
reason, none of them has ever determined an antitrust outcome.
Output as a Proxy for Welfare

Welfare generally increases as output increases. There may be
exceptions – situations where welfare declines as output increases, or
vice-versa. For example, the sale of 100 loaves that each generate a
consumers’ surplus of $1.00 will create more welfare than the sale of
150 loaves that generate a surplus of 50¢ per loaf. How often this
occurs and whether it is an antitrust problem of consequence is
considered below.260
Measuring output can be easy or difficult, depending on the
situation. If firms produce a standardized product, such as identical
bolts, measuring output may entail no more than counting the number
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of units. In addition to the cardinal units, however, output also
includes quality, which is more difficult to measure, and also
innovation, which is the most difficult.
Offsetting this is the fact that output does not generally need to
be quantified in order to establish an antitrust violation, although lost
sales may occasionally have to be estimated in order to compute
damages.261 Further, an output reduction can often be inferred from
circumstances even when it cannot be precisely measured.
For example, we can easily infer that a naked cartel on either
the buying or the selling side of the market reduces output. That is
enough for condemnation and all that the per se rule demands. If a
private plaintiff wants to obtain damages, then quantification of some
kind will be in order, but it is typically quantification of the over- or
undercharge, not of the change in output.262 Cartel damages are based
on sales that are actually made. The output reduction certainly causes
injury in fact to those who did not buy from the cartel as a result of the
price increase. They do not have standing to sue for unmade sales, but
they may in some cases obtain damages for purchases of substitute
products whose price increased with the cartel price.263 In any event,
none of this requires an estimate of welfare losses.
A case like Ohio v. American Express, Inc.,264 is a little
tougher, but not much. The anti-steering rule that was challenged
prevented a merchant from offering a customer a discount for using a
less costly card. Had that transaction been permitted it would have
resulted in lower prices to both the merchant and the consumer in every
situation in which the customer would have accepted the offer. As a
result, it was at least prima facie an output reducing restraint. Then
under the rule of reason the only remaining question was whether there
261
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was a justification. The free rider justification that the defendant
offered made no sense because Amex’s perks attached specifically to
card use. As a result, a customer who switched to a different card
would be giving up these perks, and no free riding was involved.265
The majority stated a consumer welfare principle for antitrust but
ignored or misunderstood too many important facts. Once we know
that the anti-steering rule caused higher consumer prices and higher
net merchant fees in every case that applied it, we have enough for the
government to obtain an injunction.266
A damages action by either merchants or card users would
require them to quantify their losses. The merchants would have to
estimate the dollar value of the transactions that would have been
steered to a cheaper card absent the rule, as well as the difference in
merchant acceptance fees between the two groups of transactions. The
customers would have to make similar estimates of the losses that
accrued to them. These could involve difficult calculations, but there
is no obvious reason that an expert would be unable to perform them.
The important principle driving these calculations is that the Clayton
Act does not require an estimate of welfare losses to establish
damages. The relevant language, “threefold the damages by him
sustained,”267 refers strictly to the private losses suffered by each
individual plaintiff. These are typically less than the welfare losses
caused by the offense, but in any event computation of welfare losses
is unnecessary.
Liability, although not damages, in the Actavis decision was
easy as well.268 The pay-for-delay pharmaceutical patent settlement
that the Court correctly disapproved considerably increased the price
of affected pharmaceuticals, perhaps for several years. That should
265
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have been enough to condemn it, perhaps with some lingering to
consider whether the Patent Act prevented that result. In this case it
did not.269
As private antitrust actions following from Actavis reveal, the
problem can become much more complex when we need to show
causation and private harm.270 The FTC easily succeeded in creating
an inference of higher consumer prices, but that was all it needed to
do. For a plaintiff seeking damages the hard question would be how
much higher and for how long. These issues are more difficult and
have frustrated may private plaintiffs.271
Exclusionary practices damages are conceptually a little closer
to the monopoly output reduction. For example, in the Amex case,
discussed above, competitors such as Visa and Mastercard may also
have been injured by the anti-steering rule.272 They lost transactions
that customers would have placed on their cards but for the antisteering rule. By the same token, a firm that is boycotted from a market
loses its sales in that market, and this output reduction enables the
anticompetitive price increase. Damages in such cases are based on
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lost sales or lost profits. This means that each wrongfully excluded
firm can obtain damages based on its own provable losses.273
Product Output and Harm to Labor

Output is what a firm produces and sells and that creates
consumer surplus when consumers purchase. In the ordinary course,
consumers are better off as output is larger. This is also true of
intermediaries, or those who resell or deal between the selling firm and
the consumers.
The input side of the market is where the firm purchases labor
plus the other materials and services that it requires. Assuming that
the demand for labor is a variable cost, demand for it is strongly
correlated with product output.274 A firm may have differing amounts
of market power in the markets into which it sells and those in which
it buys. In general, however, as a firm’s product output goes up or
down its need for labor follows in the same direction and amount.
Depending on whether the power is on the output side or the
input side, a firm exercises market power by reducing its output or else
by reducing its purchases. The general result of an exercise of market
power on the selling side is that the firm sells less but charges higher
prices. A firm exercising market power on the input side procures less
but also pays less. For example, if a cartel of sugar beet purchasers
exercised buying market power it would purchase fewer beets and pay
less for them.275 The output of sugar beet refiners is sugar, and it would
produce less in proportion. Whether the price of the sugar would rise
depends on whether the firm has market power in the market where it
sells. It should be clear, however, that the fundamental concern of
competition law is to produce sustainable and competitive levels of
output on both the buying side and the selling side.
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One important consequence is that restraints that reduce
product output can cause labor harm just as much as consumer harm.
Antitrust law does not often give employees standing to sue for harms
in the product market,276 but that does not change the fact that the
private as well as social cost of monopoly in the product market should
also include the cost of any anticompetitive loss in the labor market.
Possible Output Anomalies

Output does not necessarily correspond to welfare, or even to
consumer welfare. They usually, but not invariably, move in the same
direction. In a few situations output may increase or remain
unchanged as consumer welfare decreases.277 How often this actually
occurs is hard to say. How often it makes a difference in antitrust
policy is impossible to say with very much precision either, although
in this case “never” is far closer to the truth than any significantly
higher number.
Perhaps the most common example of anticompetitively higher
prices that are not accompanied by an output reduction is the
successful single-customer/single-product cartel. Suppose a market
contains three competing contractors who bid against each other for a
single customer’s project. The colluding contractors would estimate
the buyer’s reservation price278 and bid close to that amount. The
result is that the buyer pays more for the project but it buys anyway,
so output does not go down, at least for this particular iteration of the
price fix. In that case measurement of output effects alone would show
no harm. Welfare losses are also easy to compute. They equal the
difference between the competitive price and the cartel price.
As soon as the quantity is anything other than binary, however,
there would be output effects. For example, suppose that the three
276
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sellers were bidding to supply the buyer with its needs for paper clips
for one year. The cartel would still make the sale, and there is still
only a single buyer. But the buyer’s needs for paper clips would
decrease in response to the higher price. In cases with multiple buyers
the effect of the cartel price increase would also be to reduce the
number of sales. In sum, output and welfare move together with the
idiosyncratic exception of the one-off cartel to a single buyer.
An argument has also been made that vertical restraints can
sometimes reduce welfare even as they increase output.279 Figure 3
below illustrates the problem. A vertical restraint such as resale price
maintenance forces dealers to engage in greater nonprice competition,
typically by adding in services that they would not offer at a lower
price point. The impact of this practice, however, could be to increase
the reach to marginal customers, who are on the edge of the market
and agree to purchase only because of the added service. By contrast,
inframarginal customers, who would have purchased anyway, are
injured: they pay a higher price for services that they do not value.
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Figure 3

In the figure the added services shift the demand curve from D1
to D2 by bringing in the more marginal customers, but at the same time
consumer prices rise from P1 to P2. Output rises from Q1 to Q2.
Welfare, however, decreases. Prior to the resale price maintenance
consumer welfare was triangle A-D-E, but afterward it is A-B-C,
which is very likely smaller. That is, output and consumer welfare can
move in opposite directions.
The first question one might ask about this story is whether it
describes a real thing or is just another example of blackboard
economics. Here, it seems at least conceivable that the gains to the
marginal customers would be more than offset by losses suffered by
the inframarginal customers. Measuring it empirically would be
extraordinarily difficult. Indeed, at this writing vertical nonprice
restraints have been assessed under the rule of reason for almost 50
years,280 and RPM has been under the rule of reason for fifteen
years.281 There appears not to be a single case in which this rationale
was given to support condemnation of a vertical restraint.
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Even if such a situation were to be discovered, would it satisfy
the statutory requirement that the conduct “restrain trade.”
Historically, that term has been reserved for conduct that reduces
output, or the amount of trade flowing through the market.282 That is,
the text of the Sherman Act suggests a change in output, not a change
in welfare. Of course, the Sherman Act was developed by people who
very likely had little knowledge of the difference between output and
welfare. In any event, nothing suggests that they identified restraint of
trade with a reduction in consumer surplus. They did, however,
identify restraints with higher prices, and RPM clearly produces
those.283
Another problem, which is more fundamental for antitrust
policy, is that this practice has nothing to do with vertical restraints
and, indeed, not even very much to do with monopoly. It in fact results
from the fact that while products are packages of individual features,
not all customers value each feature by the same amount. They buy
because the price of the package is lower than the value they place on
it. Further, selecting the appropriate package does not require a
vertical restraint. It can result from entirely unilateral conduct.
For example, suppose that the publisher of a daily newspaper
decides to add a Sports section, increasing the paper’s price by 5¢. The
sports section increases the paper’s circulation to the “marginal”
customers, who are those that now purchase only because of the added
sports section. It might injure others who are asked to pay the
additional 5¢ but do not read the sports section. Whether welfare goes
up or down is an empirical question. It is certainly possible that the
addition of the sports section produces greater circulation but less
welfare.
In this case, adding the sports section is a unilateral act.
Further, it has nothing to do with either vertical restraints or, very
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likely, monopoly.284 Rather, it reflects the fact that a newspaper is a
product whose value to consumers is “lumpy,” in the sense that some
customers value one section more than others, but the most cost
effective way to distribute the paper is to put all of them together at a
common price.
Indeed, retailers both large and small make equivalent
decisions all the time when they decide how to package their offerings.
For example, Costco’s offering customers free bits of breakfast
sausage on a toothpick provides no benefit to vegetarians, but the
additional product and labor costs will be passed on to everyone. The
local gasoline station’s provision of free air for tires benefits only those
people who don’t have their own tire pumps. One could go on with
this list, but the point should be clear. Even if we wanted to condemn
this kind of behavior the administrative costs of doing so would be
astonishing.
A third possibility of a disconnect between output and welfare
is price discrimination. While price discrimination has been heavily
modelled in the economic literature it has never played a decisive role
in antitrust enforcement.285 As a general matter, its welfare effects are
loosely but not invariably coordinated with output effects. Price
discrimination that reduces output reduces welfare. This proposition
was established for third-degree price discrimination in the 1920s,286
and for second degree price discrimination more recently.287 The more
284
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relevant question for our purposes is whether there are instances of
price discrimination that increase output and reduce welfare.
Some instances of price discrimination can simply be predatory
pricing. This was the theory of original §2 of the Clayton Act and was
applied by the Supreme Court in Brooke Group, LTD v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.288 The answer here is that cutting price
below cost in one area of geographic or product space while not in
another can be unlawful, but only if the prices are below a relevant
measure of cost. Further, under current law the predation must be
followed by a period of recoupment, as Brooke Group required. In any
event, this situation is governed by the requirement that the relevant
output be “sustainable.” Predatory pricing under this definition is not
sustainable.
Second-degree price discrimination effected by tying
arrangements has been heavily modeled and seems to be well
understood. In nearly all cases it results in higher output and may or
may not increase welfare, depending on the circumstances.289 To
illustrate, suppose the seller of a digital printer sells the printer at a
very low price or even gives it away, but ties toner cartridges and puts
an overcharge into the cartridge price. In that case customers benefit
from the lower printer price but are harmed by the higher cartridge
price. Because different customers use the cartridges in differing
amounts, higher volume users will tend to be harmed more as the
aggregate of cartridge overcharges becomes larger, and at least some
of them could be harmed. On the other side, the firm sells more
printers.
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Once again we have to consider whether this practice “restrains
trade.” Further, in terms of consumer harm we need to consider that it
benefits some customers while harming others. As a litigation reality
check, the use of tying to effect price discrimination has been known
since the 1950s,290 but has never determined the legality of a tie.291
Finally, it is noteworthy that the practice does not require monopoly
but only relatively modest amounts of product differentiation.292 For
example, even when razors are sold in a competitive market they may
be subject to tying if they are differentiated.293

Conclusion
Antitrust is properly focused on competition. Those concerns
are explicit in the original Sherman Act and even in the Clayton Act,
passed during the height of the Progressive Era. Although Supreme
Court Justices Brandeis and his successor Justice Douglas articulated
antitrust’s goals as targeting large size, no courts have taken the bait.
Nor should they. Among antitrust’s slogans and goals, the pursuit of
“bigness” is a useless and damaging alternative, calculated to injure
both consumers and labor.
While concerns expressed as protection for the competitive
process have acquired some traction, the term lacks sufficient
definition and does not create a meaningful target for measurement. It
readily claims assent largely because it is consistent with just about
any goal that one happens to choose. “Protection of the competitive
process” operates as a slogan, not as a goal.
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Welfare standards are the ones that everyone loves to hate.
First, they have the capacity to operate as actual goals. They provide
a mechanism for measurement, which is not to say that measurement
is easy. They also align best with defensible overall goals for the
economy, which emphasize productivity, economic growth, wide
accessibility of products and services, and broad opportunities for
labor. Difficulties in implementation should not be an excuse for
replacing them with something much worse.
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